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Abstract:
We assess the e¤ects of U.S. tax policy reforms on inequality by applying a new de-
composition method allowing us to disentangle the policy e¤ect from changing market
incomes. Over the period 1979-2007, the cumulative policy e¤ect aggravated inequal-
ity by increasing the income share of the top 20% in contrast to the middle class
share. The tax policy e¤ect accounts for up to 29% of the total change in inequal-
ity; its contribution increases up to 41% if we take into account behavioral responses.
While Republican policymakers increased inequality especially at the top, Democrats
increased the income share of the bottom 80%.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades incomes have become more unequally distributed in most OECD
countries and especially in the United States (OECD 2011). In particular, the increase
of the top 1%s income share has received considerable attention (e.g., Piketty and
Saez 2003) resulting in numerous calls for higher taxes on the rich (e.g., Diamond and
Saez 2011, Piketty et al. 2011). Yet, very little is known about the actual impact of
tax policy changes on inequality. The reason is that the usual evaluation approach
comparing income inequality measures before and after taxes (see, e.g., Gottschalk
and Smeeding 1997 or Heathcote et al. 2010) is not able to isolate the pure policy
e¤ect because tax burdens are determined by both tax policy and pre-tax income
distribution. For instance, a given progressive income tax schedule redistributes more
when the distribution of taxable incomes becomes more dispersed, and not at all if
everybody earns the same (Musgrave and Thin 1948, Dardanoni and Lambert 2002).
Hence, it is unclear how much of an observed change in tax liabilities (and resulting
inequality) is due to policy reforms and what part is due to other factors, notably the
change in the underlying pre-tax income distribution.
This paper is the rst to isolate and quantify the pure tax policy e¤ect on inequality
in the U.S. for an extended time period spanning almost three decades (19792007).
Our paper can be seen as a natural follow-up of the study by Piketty and Saez (2007)
who analyze changes in the progressivity of the federal income tax over time but cannot
disentangle policy changes from other factors. We also use tax return micro data from
the Statistics of Income (SOI) division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)1 and the
NBERs TAXSIM calculator for our analysis which proceeds in two steps. First, we
perform a series of detailed counterfactual simulations by applying current and next
year tax policy rules to current and next year incomes, respectively. The resulting
decomposition shows how the post-tax income distribution would have looked like if
either tax policy (federal and state level income and payroll taxes) or the distribution
of pre-tax incomes had remained unchanged between two given years. This allows us
to quantify the direct tax policy e¤ect on inequality and to provide novel empirical
evidence on the question to what extent the increase in inequality, in particular the
surge in top income shares, is market driven or caused by major U.S. tax reforms during
the past three decades.2 In addition, we extend the baseline decomposition by using
1Note that as a robustness check, we perform the decomposition analysis on the Current Population
Survey (CPS) and show that results are in line with those based on tax return data. This comparison
of how the policy e¤ect on inequality di¤ers between IRS SOI tax return and CPS data complements
the analysis by Burkhauser et al. (2012a) who reconcile estimates on top income shares between these
two data sources.
2Our approach formalizes analyses of policy e¤ects, as performed for instance by Clark and Leices-
ter (2004) for the United Kingdom. See also Bargain and Callan (2010) for France and Ireland. A
related concept for the comparison of tax regimes with respect to progressivity the transplant-and-
compare procedure (Dardanoni and Lambert 2002) is applied by Lambert and Thoresen (2009) for
Norway. They isolate the tax policy e¤ect by comparing pre-tax income distributions which have been
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estimates for the elasticity of taxable income (ETI, see Saez et al. 2012 for a survey)
in order to account for indirect policy e¤ects due to behavioral responses (such as
labor supply, income shifting or migration). Second, we use the derived policy e¤ect to
uncover policymakersredistributive intentions. Thus, we contribute to the literature
on the political economy of redistribution (e.g. Bartels 2008) by estimating the tax
policy e¤ect on inequality of Democratic versus Republican governments. In contrast
to conventional measures, such as pre- or post-tax inequality which are a¤ected by
other factors beyond the control of policymakers, our decomposition method enables
us to investigate the intendedimpact of tax policy on the income distribution.
Our main ndings are as follows. The baseline decomposition shows that the size of
the policy e¤ect corresponds to 1129% of the total change in income shares of di¤erent
income groups. The impact is largest for taxpayers in the 95th to 99th percentile of the
income distribution, but smallest for those in the top 1%. This shows that tax policy
had a non-negligible e¤ect on changes in inequality, but explains only a small fraction
of the sharp increase of the top 1%s income share, where other forces played a much
more important role. Extending the baseline decomposition and accounting for indirect
policy e¤ects (i.e. behavioral responses) does not a¤ect our results qualitatively, but
yields a larger overall policy e¤ect on inequality (up to 41% of the total change). We also
nd that reforms in the 1980s and early 2000s exacerbated trends of growing inequality,
those in the early 1990s beneted low-income taxpayers. The cumulative policy e¤ect
over the entire period contributed to the increasing income share of taxpayers in the
top quintile (and especially the top decile) at the cost of middle class taxpayers. Hence,
without any tax policy changes, observed inequality would be lower nowadays. In the
second part of our analysis, we show that tax reforms of Republican policymakers
beneted the top quintile at the cost of the bottom 80%, whereas the opposite is true
for Democrats. The partisan e¤ect of controlling either the legislative or the executive
branch of state governments accounts for 12-42% (depending on the inequality measure)
of the total change in post-tax inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related U.S.
income inequality literature. The decomposition analysis, the data and income concepts
are described in section 3. Decomposition results are presented in section 4. Section 5
analyzes how the political cycle in the U.S. has a¤ected inequality. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Rising income inequality in the U.S. has stimulated a large body of research examining
the underlying driving factors. In this literature, several strands have emerged which
focus on di¤erent types of inequality. While the focus of this paper is on redistribution
adjusted to a common base.
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and the impact of tax policy on trends in post-tax income inequality, this cannot be
comprehensively assessed without taking into account trends in pre-tax inequality.
The existing evidence on pre-tax inequality in the U.S. points to a widening gap
in the last thirty years, in particular at the top of the distribution. In a seminal
contribution, Piketty and Saez (2003) (updated 2012) build a series of pre-tax income
shares based on tax return data from the IRS. They nd that inequality grew relatively
smoothly in the time period considered here. Further studies relying on IRS tax return
data are, among others, Slemrod (1992), Feenberg and Poterba (1993), DeBacker et al.
(2012) and Bakija et al. (2012) who, in particular, look at top incomes. Similar trends
are found in analyses using CPS data.3 A general conclusion from these studies is that
total income inequality, i.e. inequality in pre-tax, posttransfer income rose sharply in
the 1980s, and that this growth continued at a reduced pace in the 1990s and early
2000s. Burkhauser et al. (2012a) seek to reconcile ndings from IRS SOI and CPS
data. They use internal CPS data which are compared with public-use CPS much
less a¤ected by topcoding (although a number of other measurement and conceptual
di¤erences remain) and apply similar income denitions as Piketty and Saez (2003) do,
namely pre-transfer, tax-unit income. They conclude that the rise in inequality from
1993 onwards is mainly due to gains made by the top 1% of the income distribution.
A related strand of the literature examines how pre-tax or taxable income is a¤ected
by behavioral responses to tax policy changes. For instance, it has been shown that
the EITC reforms had a substantial impact on participation rates of married couples
and single mothers (cf., Eissa and Hoynes 2006 and Eissa et al. 2008, among others).
In addition to adjustments in participation or hours worked, tax reforms may a¤ect
other margins such as tax evasion or the timing of capital gains realizations with the
latter two of particular relevance at the period around the Tax Reform Act (TRA)
of 1986 (Auerbach 1988, Feenberg and Poterba 1993, Slemrod 1996, Auerbach and
Slemrod 1997). More disputed is the question to what extent the increase in inequality,
especially at the top of the distribution, is due to responses such as income shifting
from corporate to personal income, i.e. if the documented increase is real or caused by
behavioral responses (see in particular Saez 2004 and Reynolds 2007). The recognition
of the importance of these responses has led to the growing tax responsiveness literature
focusing on the ETI which shall capture all these behavioral responses (see Saez et al.
2012 for a survey).
We contribute to the literature which examines the impact of tax policy on post-
3See e.g. Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), Heathcote et al. (2010) and Burkhauser et al. (2011).
Di¤erences between these studies exist with regard to the denition of the income unit (family vs.
household), sample selection (full population vs. working-age population) and whether or not top-
coding in the public-use CPS is accounted for. Burkhauser et al. (2012b) show that di¤erences in
inequality trends based on income tax return data and the CPS can be explained by di¤erent income
measures and sharing units. Most notably, median income growth is shown to be signicantly higher
with a broader income measure including cash and in-kind transfers and with economies of scale in
household consumption taken into account.
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tax income inequality. By extracting the direct policy e¤ect through counterfactual
simulations, we complement analyses conducted by Piketty and Saez (2007) or the
Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2010). In these studies, shares of post-tax income and
average federal tax rates are calculated for various income groups and similar time
periods. However, their estimates do not isolate the direct policy e¤ect since they
reect both legislative changes as well as other factors which inuence income and tax
rates. Some studies have conducted so-called what ifcalculations (Poterba 2007) but
to the best of our knowledge, none of these papers have sought to identify a policy e¤ect
on a year-by-year basis over a long time period. We are aware of two early contributions
which explicitly consider via counterfactual simulations the impact of tax policy on
the post-tax income distribution. Lindsey (1987) applies this methodology to estimate
taxable income elasticities in response to the Reagan tax reform in the early 1980s.
Gramlich et al. (1993) apply tax and transfer policies of 1980 and 1985 to the pre-
tax income distribution of 1990. They report that 16% of the increase in the Gini
coe¢ cient from 1980 to 1990 are due to changes in taxes and transfers. More recently,
Poterba (2007) conducts conceptually similar policy swaps by applying 2004 e¤ective
tax rates to the 2000 pre-tax income distribution and vice versa and examines the
resulting e¤ects on the share of post-tax (but before payroll tax) income accruing to
various income groups. A key nding from his analysis is that the impact of changes
in the pre-tax income distribution is approximately four times as large as the policy
e¤ect of changes in e¤ective tax rates.4
The second strand of literature to which our study directly relates examines the
relationship between partisan politics and redistribution. Here, it is important to di¤er-
entiate between studies which seek to identify partisan e¤ects either on social spending
and tax levels or on direct measures of inequality such as pre- and post-tax inequality.
Traditionally, some measures of social spending or tax levels are used to evaluate the
generosity of government policies (McCarty and Pontusson 2009). Pettersson-Lidbom
(2008) nds spending and tax levels to be 23% higher under leftist governments in
a panel of Swedish local governments. Reed (2006) estimates for a 40-year panel of
U.S. states that a Democratic state legislature is associated with a 35% higher state
tax burden. Scheve and Stasavage (2009) analyze the e¤ect of partisanship on pre-tax
inequality for a panel of 13 OECD countries spanning the 20th century and do not nd
a statistically signicant e¤ect except for the income share of the top 1% which is
very small, however. Bartels (2008) compares real pre-tax income growth of a­ uent,
4Further studies examining the degree of redistribution of the U.S. income tax system by means
of policy swaps are Kasten et al. (1994), Mitrusi and Poterba (2000), Alm et al. (2005), Leigh (2008a)
and Meyer (2010). However, these studies do not quantify how much of an observed change in posttax
income inequality is due to policy changes. Instead, the focus of these contributions is on the changing
importance of income and payroll taxes over time (Mitrusi and Poterba 2000), on the progressivity of
the income tax (Kasten et al. 1994 and Alm et al. 2005), the redistributiveness of state taxes (Leigh
2008a) and the distributional e¤ect of the EITC reform enacted through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Meyer 2010).
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middle-class and working poor families for the period 19482005 showing that overall
pre-tax income growth was largest for high-income families, but only in periods with
Republican Presidents. He nds similar patterns of post-tax income growth for the pe-
riod 19802003. Leigh (2008b) estimates for a panel of U.S. states from 19412002 the
e¤ect of gubernatorial partisanship on various economic outcomes including pre- and
post-tax inequality and nds mostly insignicant results. Our approach di¤ers from all
these studies since our policy e¤ect, which summarizes the impact of multi-dimensional
tax policy reforms, is una¤acted by changes in pre-tax inequality and, hence, can be
seen as a direct measure of the partisan e¤ect on post-tax inequality.
3 Empirical approach
3.1 Decomposition methodology
In order to decompose inequality changes into the e¤ect of tax policy and all other
factors, we follow and extend the approach suggested by Bargain and Callan (2010). It
is important to note that, by construction, in the baseline decomposition the tax policy
e¤ectmeasures only the direct e¤ect of tax policy on the (given) income distribution
abstracting from any behavioral responses (such as changes in labor supply or income
shifting) or general equilibrium e¤ects as a consequence of tax policy changes (e.g.
due to di¤erential growth or changes in labor demand or immigration).5 These are
captured by the other e¤ectwhich additionally includes all exogenous changes to
the income distribution which occur independent of tax policy. In an extension of our
baseline decomposition, we try to additionally quantify the endogenous indirect tax
policy e¤ects.
Consider a data matrix y containing information on individualspre-tax income
from di¤erent sources as well as various individual and household characteristics which
are relevant for the calculation of income and payroll taxes. The tax function d rep-
resents the rules and structure of the tax system (e.g., marginal tax and contribution
rates) while vector p accounts for all the monetary parameters (e.g., tax brackets). The
distribution of post-tax income is represented by di(pj; yl) for tax rules of year i, tax
parameters of year j and nominal incomes (and characteristics) of year l. For counter-
factual simulations, it is necessary to nominally adjust income levels by an uprating
factor  accounting for nominal changes (e.g. ination) between base and end year.
For the decomposition, two di¤erent approaches are possible: it can be conducted
either on base year or on end year incomes while applying tax policy of the respective
other year. The two approaches usually lead to identical results. If they di¤er, this is
5This approach is supported by Piketty and Saez (2007) who argue that given the controversy
about behavioral responses to taxation "[...] considering the basic case with no behavioral response is
a useful starting place" (p. 9).
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an indication of either general equilibrium e¤ects of tax policy or income shifting from
other income sources to personal income, as discussed below. In the rst approach,
the counterfactual situation dt+1(pt+1; t+1yt) represents post-tax incomes obtained by
applying tax rules and parameters of year t + 1 on year t data nominally adjusted to
year t+1. Here the policy of end year t+1 is applied while holding the pre-tax incomes
of year t constant. In the second approach, the initial policy from year t is applied to





) where pre-tax incomes are adjusted with the same factor t+1 used to scale
up the distribution of pre-tax income between period t and t+1.6 As further explained
below, policy changes usually combine changes in policy structure d and changes in
parameters p (the uprating policy).
In the empirical part, we are interested in distributional measures M , computed





of the simulated distribution of post-tax income. The
advantage of the present approach is that we can use any measure and not only those
with specic properties (i.e., decomposable inequality indices). More generally, it is
possible to decompose any scalar M such as inequality indices, (top) income shares,
average and marginal tax rates or measures of redistribution. Characterize the total





 M dt(pt; yt) (1)
and notice that the last term can also be writtenM [dt(t+1pt; t+1yt)] since function d
is linearly homogenous in p and y.7 Then, the total change between periods t and t+ 1
can be decomposed into a change in tax policy and a change in the pre-tax income
distribution. We refer to the last change as the other e¤ect. The policy e¤ectcan
be assessed on end period data yt+1, and in this case, the other e¤ect is assessed on
the base period tax system, yielding decomposition I:
M = M [dt+1(p










)] M [dt(pt; yt)]| {z }
other e¤ect I
In this case, base period tax parameters are applied to end period data yt+1 after
6A measure dt(pt; yt+1) would not be consistent since base-period parameters would be articially
applied to end-period income levels. For instance, previous tax band thresholds would be applied
to new and possibly higher income levels, thereby generating articial scal dragor bracket creep
(Saez 2003).
7Converting tax parameters and income from dollars into euros does not change the relative
location of households in the distribution of posttax income.
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nominal adjustment, i.e. y
t+1
t+1
: Symmetrically, the decomposition can be written as a
policy e¤ect assessed on base year data followed by a change in the underlying data
conditional on the new policy. Decomposition II can thus be written as:
M = M [dt+1(p




t+1; t+1yt)] M [dt(pt; yt)]| {z }
policy e¤ect II
:
Here, the end period tax system is evaluated on nominally adjusted base period data
t+1yt.
Note again that, by construction and in line with Piketty and Saez (2007), both
policy e¤ects in the baseline decompositions capture only the direct e¤ect of tax policy
on the income distribution. Behavioral responses to tax policy changes are attributed
to the other e¤ect (together with exogenous changes to the income distribution). In
section 4.3, we further decompose the other e¤ect into an indirect policy e¤ect and a
residual e¤ect.
As the decompositions are path-dependent, we suggest to simply average both pol-
icy and other e¤ect over the decompositions I and II. This corresponds to Shorrocks
(1999)s reinterpretation of the Shapley value procedure. In the empirical part, we
verify that results based on decompositions I and II usually do not di¤er (much).
Exceptions indicate that signicant (behavioral or conceptual) changes between base
and end year occured, which were not captured in one years data but present in the
other yearsdata (such as income shifting between the corporate and private sector in
anticipation of TRA86 or realizations of capital gains, as discussed below).
Notice that policy and other e¤ect are a¤ected by the choice of the uprating pa-
rameter . The way tax brackets are uprated by governments can have important
implications for the income distribution in the long run. Usually there are three op-
tions: (1) no uprating, (2) uprating according to the level of price ination, (3) uprating
according to the level of earnings growth. With non-indexation of tax brackets in pro-
gressive systems, or price indexation when incomes rise faster than prices, the total
number of taxpayers (and the number of higher-rate taxpayers) increases. This phe-
nomenon of bracket creep is likely to a¤ect the nal distribution of post-tax income.
In our empirical application, we use changes in the consumer price index to adjust
pre-tax incomes in the counterfactuals which is equivalent to an indexation of tax
brackets. This reference situation is extensively used in policy analyses of tax reforms
(cf., discussion in Clark and Leicester 2004). In a robustness check, we rely on a more
conservative approach based on nominal wage growth, i.e., a distributionally-neutral
scenario (Bargain and Callan 2010).
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3.2 Data
Several data sources have been used in studies on the impact of taxation on income
inequality, in particular tax return data (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2007) and household
surveys such as the CPS (e.g. Alm et al. 2005). It is well-known that there are advan-
tages and disadvantages for both types of data (Poterba 2007). In brief, tax return data
allow to precisely calculate top income shares, but do not contain information about
non-ling households (typically at the bottom of the distribution) and lack certain (not
tax-relevant) components of household income. In this study, we use large public use
les of tax return data released. Annual cross-sectional micro-data are available from
the SOI since 1960, but given that TAXSIM is able to simulate state level income taxes
only from 1979 onwards, we start our analysis in 1979.8
We follow Piketty and Saez (2007) in terms of sample selection and include both
ling and non-ling tax units so that income groups such as quintiles or top percentiles
are based on the total population.9 Throughout this paper, we focus on pre and
post-tax income inequality. Tax units are ranked based on pre-tax incomes excluding
capital gains as they are not a regular stream of income. For all subsequent calculations,
capital gains are added back to pre- and post-tax incomes. Pre-tax income includes all
sources of market income which are reported on tax returns, i.e. wages and salaries;
bonuses and exercised stock-options; employer and private pensions; self-employment
income; business income; dividends, interest, and rents; and realized capital gains.
Post-tax income is dened as pre-tax income minus the simulated components of the
income tax system including federal and state level income taxes, employee social
insurance contributions (payroll taxes), and tax credits (e.g. EITC). As is common in
the literature, we thus assume that the burden of the taxes is borne by those who remit
them and is not shifted elsewhere through adjustments in pre-tax wages and prices.
Our measures of income do not include imputed corporate or federal estate and gift
taxes. It is important to note that the policy e¤ect, which is the focus of this study,
is not a¤ected by (omitting) these taxes given that we simulate them neither in the
8In a previous version of this paper, we have performed our calculations with data from IPUMS-
CPS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey) which is a rich micro-data
set of U.S. households and a primary data source for investigating income distribution trends. However,
it does not contain information about itemized deductions and capital gains which are important in
any analysis on top incomes. Further, for condentiality reasons, the U.S. Census Bureau top codes
all income sources, with di¤erences in methods between some years. This can cause a downward bias
of income inequality estimates (cf. Burkhauser et al. 2011). We compare the result from SOI to those
obtained from CPS data in section 4.4.
9The total number of tax units in the US ranges from 97.5 million in 1979 to almost 150 million
in 2007. Over the sample period, the share of tax units which le a tax return is roughly between
9296% (see online appendix of Piketty and Saez (2003), updated to 2010). Nonling tax units are
imputed as in Piketty and Saez (2007), i.e. under the assumption that they earn 20% of the average
income of ling units. Because of this imputation, we usually do not report the decomposition results
for the bottom quintile (P0-20) which mainly consists of non-ling tax units or households with low
market incomes.
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baseline nor in the counterfactual scenarios.10
In order to calculate income and payroll taxes, we use NBERs simulation model
TAXSIM.11 We use simulated taxes for all computation of taxes and post-tax incomes
including the observed case of current year income and current year tax policy. A
comparison of tax liabilities observed in the income tax return data with the simu-
lated TAXSIM output leads to a perfect match in more than 99% of all cases for each
year with no systematic di¤erences across the income distribution. The simulation
approach allows us to conduct controlled experiments by changing the parameters of
interest while holding everything else constant which avoids, by denition, endogeneity
problems when identifying the e¤ects of the policy reform under consideration (Bour-
guignon and Spadaro 2006). When assessing the isolated role of tax policy on income
inequality (i.e. the policy e¤ect), we are thus able to account for changes in federal
and state level income taxes as well as payroll taxes and tax credits. Importantly, the
policy e¤ect is solely a¤ected by changes in these taxes.
3.3 U.S. tax history
In this section, we briey outline the major changes in the U.S. income tax system from
1979 until 2007 which are also summarized in an online appendix (Appendix A.3). We
concentrate on large legislative changes which drive the tax policy e¤ect. Reforms of
interest are the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81), the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA86), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90
and OBRA93), the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), the Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA01) and the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA03).
ERTA81 introduced the indexation of individual income tax parameters which be-
came e¤ective in 1985. Tax cuts were phased in over the years 19821984, with a
reduction of top marginal tax rates from 70% to 50% in 1982 and of other tax rates by
23% in three annual steps. Further, the income threshold for the top rate substantially
increased from $85,600 in 1982 to $109,400 (1983) and $162,400 (1984) for married
couples ling jointly. Similarly, thresholds were increased for couples ling separately
and for singles. The reduction in tax revenue amounted to 2.89% of GDP (four year av-
erage, c.f. Tempalski (2006) for estimates of revenue e¤ects mentioned in this section).
Key aspects of TRA86 were the broadening of the tax base and reductions in marginal
10Some of the caveats discussed by Piketty and Saez (2007) apply to our study as well. In particular,
we ignore the redistributive e¤ect of government transfers and untaxed income such as inkind benets
(except tax credits such as the EITC). Furthermore, our data are repeated cross-sections and we
therefore abstract from any lifecycle perspective.
11For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/. It contains all income and payroll tax rules which apply in a
given year.
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tax rates. Overall, the reform was almost revenue neutral.12 TRA86 further lowered
the top marginal rate to 38.5% in 1987 and to 28% in 1988, reduced the number of tax
brackets from 15 in 1986 to four in 1988, but also substantially expanded the EITC
with nancial benets for lowincome households.
OBRA90 contained increases in income taxes as well as expansions of the EITC
and other lowincome credits. Furthermore, payroll taxes were increased by lifting the
taxable maximum for Hospital Insurance which was nally abolished in 1994. OBRA93
then led to the largest single expansion of the EITC (cf. Eissa and Hoynes 2011), and
further increases in income tax rates were implemented, e.g. the top rate rose from
31% to 39.6% in 1993. The EITC became much more generous in 1994 with higher
maximum credits and an expansion to single workers with no children. The EITC was
further expanded in the following years. The revenue e¤ect of OBRA90 and OBRA93
was again evaluated on a four year average positive and amounted to 0.5% and
0.63% of GDP, respectively. TRA97 lowered capital gains tax rates and introduced
additional tax credits (child and education tax credits).
EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03 were characterized by reductions in marginal tax
rates, both for lowand highincome families, expansions of the child tax credits, and
reductions in taxes on dividends. In 2003, JGTRRA accelerated those provisions of
EGTRRA which were not set to become e¤ective until 2006. Both reforms had a
revenuedecreasing e¤ect (0.71% and 0.57% of GDP, 4 year average).
4 Decomposition results
4.1 Major tax reforms
We start our analysis by illustrating the decomposition procedure for each major tax
reform in our sample period. In Table 3 in Appendix A.2, we compare average tax rates
(including federal and state level income as well as payroll taxes) and post-tax income
shares for various income groups before the start of the reform and after it was fully
phased-in (base and end year). We decompose the total change into two components
as explained in section 3. The rst is due to tax reforms (policy e¤ect) while the second
is due to changes in the pre-tax income distribution (other e¤ect) which may include
indirect policy e¤ects. The left part of the table reports the di¤erent components
of the decomposition, including base and end period baselines (columns (1) and (4)
respectively), the two relevant counterfactuals as well as the total change. Columns
(2) and (3) show the counterfactuals with average tax rates and income shares given
end period pre-tax incomes and base period tax legislation (column 2), and base period
pre-tax incomes and end period tax legislation (column 3). The right part of Table 3
12As part of the tax burden was e¤ectively shifted from the individual to the corporate sector which
is not part of our analysis, TRA86 constitutes a tax cut in the context of this paper.
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reports both the policy and the other e¤ect for decompositions I, II and the Shapley
value (i.e. the mean of the two decompositions). As they yield almost identical results
in most cases, we will focus on the Shapley-value. An exception is TRA86 where
the di¤erence between decomposition I and II does matter which is discussed below.
Reassuringly, the policy e¤ect is (close to) zero in years without (major) tax changes
and the observed change equals the other e¤ect.
Policy vs. other e¤ect. The policy e¤ect reveals how average tax rates and income
shares would have changed under constant pre-tax incomes but changing policy. It
is based on a counterfactual scenario in which the composition of pre-tax incomes
remains constant, and pre-tax incomes grow in accordance with the ination rate which
is used for parameter adjustments in the counterfactuals.13 Adding the policy e¤ect
to the baseline values yields counterfactual values of average tax rates and income
shares under constant pre-tax incomes, but changing policy parameters. A positive
(negative) value of the other e¤ect implies that the average tax rate of a given income
group would have increased (decreased) in the absence of direct policy changes. This
can either be due to pre-tax income growth above (below) the ination rate or due to
changes in the composition of pre-tax incomes or tax units.14 In the case of post-tax
income shares, the interpretation slightly di¤ers as an increase in the income share of
one group automatically implies that the share of at least one other group must have
decreased. Here, the other e¤ect shows how income shares would have changed in the
absence of direct policy changes.
From 1981 to 1984, the period around ERTA81, average tax rates decreased for
all income groups. Starting with the other e¤ect, we observe that changes in pre-tax
incomes have pushed average tax rates up only for the top 0.1% of the population. For
all other income groups, average tax rate would have decreased even in the absence
of the tax reform due to the the recessionary period in the early 1980s or due to
indirect policy e¤ects. Results for the policy e¤ect show that with the exception of the
second quintile, legislative changes led to reductions in average tax rates which were
largest for the upper part of the income distribution. As an example, the cumulative
policy e¤ect from 1981 to 1984 reduced the average tax rate for those in the top 0.01%
by 5.6 points, while the negative policy e¤ect for the third and fourth quintile (-0.1
and -0.7, respectively) was only marginal. With regard to the absolute size of policy
and other e¤ect, the reduction in average tax rates due changes in pre-tax incomes
and indirect policy e¤ects was larger than the reduction caused by the direct policy
e¤ect for taxpayers up to the fourth quintile. For those in the ninth decile and above,
13Results are robust when the adjustment of pretax incomes in the counterfactuals is based on
mean nominal wage growth instead of the ination rate (see section 4.4).
14A shift in the income composition to sources which are taxed by a lower rate ceteris paribus leads
to a negative other e¤ect.
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the absolute size of the policy e¤ect was larger than the other e¤ect. Moving to the
e¤ect of ERTA81 on inequality, we nd that income shares for those below (above)
the 80th percentile would have decreased (increased) in the absence of any (direct)
policy changes. The direct policy e¤ect strengthened this e¤ect. We conclude that
ERTA81 exacerbated the increase in inequality such that post-tax income shares were
more unequal in 1984 compared with a counterfactual of no policy changes.
Contrary to ERTA81, TRA86 contained both inequality-increasing (reduction in
top marginal tax rates) and -decreasing elements (expansion of EITC, tax base broad-
ening). Table 3 reveals that it was mainly the top 1% which experienced substantial
reductions in average tax rates and increases in their income shares. Furthermore,
our decomposition for TRA86 shows that it makes a di¤erence if the policy and other
e¤ect are evaluated on base or end period data. This can be explained by behavioral
reactions, in particular income shifting and timing responses. Capital gains realiza-
tions peaked in 1986 in anticipation of the increase in the marginal tax rate on realized
long-term capital gains from 20% to 28% in 1987. Furthermore, taxpayers shifted in-
come from the corporate to the individual sector as a response to the reduction of the
top marginal rate which fell from 1986 to 1988 in two steps from 50% to 28% and
thus below the basic corporation income tax rate (see e.g. Auerbach 1988, Feenberg
and Poterba 1993 and Slemrod 1996).15 For taxpayers in the top 1%, the hypothetical
average tax rate with 1988 policy parameters, but 1986 pre-tax incomes (column 3)
would have been much higher than the observed average tax rate in 1988 (column 4)
due to the fact that a substantially larger share of their income in 1986 consisted of
long-term capital gains which were taxed at a higher rate in 1988. Conversely, the
hypothetical average tax rate with 1988 pre-tax incomes, but 1986 policy parameters
(column 2) picks up the e¤ect of a larger share of wage and entrepreneurial income
reported by a­ uent taxpayers in 1988. Di¤erences between decompositions I and II
are thus driven by behavioral responses of taxpayers which caused a dramatic change
in their income composition around TRA86.16
OBRA90 and OBRA93 counteracted the growing inequality at that time at least
to some extent. The other e¤ect on post-tax income shares was negative for those below
the 80th percentile implying that their income share would have declined substantially.
Due to expansions of the EITC the policy e¤ect led to a considerable reduction in
15For those in the top 1%, entrepreneurial income made up 11.1% of their total income (excl.
capital gains) in 1986, but 21.2% in 1988. Conversely, capital gains made up 38.8% of their total
income (incl. capital gains) in 1986, but only 14.6% in 1988 (see updated tables to Piketty and Saez
(2003), accessible at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/).
16Note that the way we rank tax units, i.e. based on their pre-tax incomes excluding capital gains
which are added back for the calculation of average tax rates and income shares, might critically a¤ect
our decomposition results when signicant changes in the amount of realized capital gains occur from
one period to the other. In section 4.4, we show how results change for TRA86 when tax units are
ranked based on pre-tax incomes including capital gains, which provides additional evidence for the
impact of behavioral changes around TRA86 on our decomposition results.
12
average tax rates of those in the lower half of the distribution, in particular in the
second quintile, while increases in marginal rates caused average tax rates to rise in
the upper half of the distribution. This e¤ect was strongest at the top of the distribution
where the policy e¤ect increased average tax rates, for instance, for those in the top
0.01% by more than 11 percentage points. Unsurprisingly, the cumulative policy e¤ect
of OBRA90 and OBRA93 on the income share of the top 1% was negative, while it
was positive for the rest of the population and again largest for those in the second
quintile.
Decomposition results for EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03 show that, similar to pre-
vious periods, the other e¤ect pushed average tax rates up only for the top 1%. The
tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003, however, led to substantial reductions in average
tax rates across the distribution, with strongest policy e¤ects in absolute terms at
the top of the distribution. The positive policy e¤ect on the income share of those at
the top underlines the inequality-increasing e¤ect of the Bush tax cuts.
4.2 Cumulative e¤ects over time
In this section, we focus on the cumulative e¤ect of changes in policy and pre-tax in-
comes on average tax rates and income shares over the entire period.17 An extension of
our baseline decomposition which additionally includes indirect policy e¤ects resulting
from behavioral responses to tax changes is presented in section 4.3.
Average tax rates. We rst turn to the results for average tax rates. Figure 1
shows how the total average tax rate developed from 1979 to 2007 (black diamond).
Additionally, we consider two counterfactual scenarios. These counterfactuals reveal
how the average tax rate would have changed if either policy parameters or pre-tax
incomes would have remained as observed in the base year 1979. Over the entire
period, the policy e¤ect (other e¤ect) pushed the average tax rate down (up) as can
be seen by the hollow (black) triangles. In particular, policy changes implemented in
the 1980s and early 2000s had a dampening impact on the total average tax rate, while
the reforms in the early 1990s to some extent reversed the Reagan tax cuts. If policy
parameters had remained constant on their 1979 level, the total average tax rate would
have almost constantly grown from 1982 until 2000. This is due to the fact that total
income grew faster than the ination rate which is used to adjust pre-tax incomes in
the counterfactuals.
17This can be done in two ways. First, one can look at several year-by-year changes (eg. from
1979 to 1980 and then from 1980 to 1981) and then add them up. Second, one can hold a base year
constant (e.g. 1979) and look at the changes to various end years (e.g. 1980, 1981, ...). In addition,
various combinations are possible (e.g. adding up 3-year or 5-year changes). This can lead to an
almost innite number of potential results. In our empirical analysis, it turned out that the di¤erent
approaches lead to very similar results (both in terms of magnitude of the e¤ects and trends). Hence,
we decided to focus on the rst approach.
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observed policy const. pre-tax incomes const.
Average tax rate incl. (federal and state level) income and payroll taxes
Full population
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classication).
Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI
IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
Clearly, any diverging trends across income groups are hidden behind this aggregate
average tax rate. Therefore, in Figures 2 and 3, we plot changes in average tax rates for
income quintiles and fractiles of the top 1% comparing the actual change (left panel)
with the counterfactual scenario of constant pre-tax incomes (right panel), respectively.
Hence, the right panel shows how average tax rates would have developed if the pre-
tax income distribution had remained on its 1979 level and only policy parameters had
changed over our sample period. Importantly, the di¤erence between these two series
is given by the other e¤ect capturing the impact of changes in pre-tax incomes on the
average tax rate conditional on constant policy parameters.
We start with the income shares reported in Figure 2. Several important ndings
stand out. First, in absolute terms, the dampening policy e¤ect on average tax rates
was smallest for the third (P40-60) and fourth (P60-80) quintile and largest for the
second (P20-40) and fth (P80-100) quintile. Hence, it is the middle and upper middle
class which beneted least from changes in tax policy. Second, taxpayers in the top
quintile beneted more from tax policy than is visible in the left panel due to the fact
that the other e¤ect pushed their average tax rate up. The opposite is true for all
other taxpayers for whom the other e¤ect had a dampening e¤ect on the average tax
rate. Third, the right panel gives an indication of how the political cycle might have
a¤ected average tax rates at di¤erent parts of the income distribution. In short, the
14

















































































































Average tax rate incl. (federal and state level) income and payroll taxes
P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100
Note: P20-40: Second quintile, P40-60: Third quintile, P60-80: Fourth quintile. P80-100:
Fifth quintile. The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication). Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations
based on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
tax burden on high-income taxpayers (fourth and fth quintile) was reduced under the
Republican administrations in the 1980s and early 2000s, whereas low-income taxpayers
(second quintile) faced largest reductions under the Democratic administrations in the
1990s. The picture for the third quintile is di¤erent as their tax burden rst rose under
Republican administrations in the 1980s, but was subsequently reduced to a similar
extent under Democratic (1990s) and Republican (early 2000s) administrations this
will be investigated more thorougly in Section 5.
Figure 3 reveals that policy changes a¤ecting the top 1% of taxpayers had a much
stronger impact on average tax rates than for the rest of the population. Even within
this group, taxpayers were a¤ected rather di¤erently. Policy changes reduced the aver-
age tax rate of taxpayers located within the 99-99.5 fractile by roughly three percentage
points, but by more than twelve points for those in the top 0.01% between 1979 and
2007. Observed changes in average tax rates were mainly driven by the policy e¤ect.
In contrast to results for taxpayers in the top quintile (Figure 2), the other e¤ect did
not push up average tax rates of the richest taxpayers despite the tremendous income
growth this group experienced over the sample period. As discussed above, the neg-
ative other e¤ect on average tax rates for those in the top 1% was largely due to the
changing composition of their pre-tax incomes, partly caused by behavioral reactions
15
around TRA86.








































































































Policy  ef f ect
Average tax rate inc l. (federal and state level) income and payroll taxes
P99-99.5 P99.5-99.9
P99.9-99.99 P99.99-100
Note: The graph shows changes for four fractiles within the top 1%. The dashed vertical
lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant changes in tax legislation (section
3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classication). Uprating according to the
level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data
and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
Income shares. Now we turn to the e¤ect of tax policy on inequality. The left panel
of Figure 4 shows how post-tax income shares of taxpayers in the second to fth quintile
have changed relative to the base year pre-tax income share, while the policy e¤ect on
post-tax income shares is shown in the right panel. We nd a stark contrast between
the observed change in income shares and the policy e¤ect. The income share of those
in the top quintile increased by roughly 24% over the whole sample period, whereas all
other groups saw their income shares declining, with cumulative losses ranging from
22% (fourth quintile) to 28% (second quintile). Tax policy contributed to the increase
(decrease) in the income share of those in the top (third and fourth) quintile with an
overall direct policy e¤ect of roughly 1% (minus 2%). Remarkably, the cumulative
policy e¤ect on the income share of those in the second quintile almost canceled out
over time. The direct tax policy e¤ect was equalizing in some periods and disequalizing
in others which is in line with the results for the policy e¤ect on average tax rates.
Again, the di¤erent sub-periods broadly coincide with the political cycle.
Figure 5 shows results for taxpayers in the top 1%. As for average tax rates (Figure
16
























































































































Policy  ef f ect
P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100
Note: P20-40: Second quintile, P40-60: Third quintile, P60-80: Fourth quintile. P80-100:
Fifth quintile. The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication). Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations
based on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
3), observed changes in income shares as well as the policy e¤ect were much larger at
the top of the distribution than for any other income group. For instance, from 1979
to 2007 the income share of those in the top 0.01% has risen by 350% with the direct
policy e¤ect contributing 18% to the increase. Interestingly, the highly disequalizing
direct policy e¤ect in the 1980s was almost completely reversed after OBRA93, but
the tax cuts in the early 2000s reinforced the overall increase in inequality.
Relative importance. The di¤erence in scale of the left- and right-hand side panels
in Figures 4 and 5 suggests that changes in pre-tax incomes (the other e¤ect) were the
main driver of the total change in inequality. While this nding clearly conrms general
perceptions about the roots of increasing inequality, it does not account for the fact,
however, that the direct policy e¤ect was equalizing in some periods and disequalizing
in others and that these di¤erential e¤ects to some extent canceled out over the period
of analysis. Calculating the mean of the absolute values of the policy e¤ect and the
total change, respectively, and expressing the former as a fraction of the latter, we nd
a non-trivial impact of policy changes. This is shown in Table 1 for average tax rates
and income shares. Columns (1) and (3) present baseline results for the direct policy
17





















































































































P99-99.5 P99.5-99.9 P99.9-99.99 P99.99-100
Note: The graph shows changes for four fractiles within the top 1%. The dashed vertical
lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant changes in tax legislation (section
3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classication). Uprating according to the
level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data
and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
e¤ect without behavioral reactions (see section 4.3 for the total policy e¤ect including
indirect policy e¤ects). Unsurprisingly, column (1) reveals that policy changes matter
more for average tax rates than changes in pre-tax incomes with the policy e¤ect as a
fraction of the total change ranging from 51% to 99% depending on the income group.
Interestingly, the importance of the policy e¤ect relative to the other e¤ect is highest
for taxpayers in the 95th to 99th percentile. The corresponding value for those in the
top 1% is much smaller (77.5%). The reason is that the other e¤ect was larger for the
top 1% than for those in the 95th to 99th percentile due to the tremendous income
growth experienced by the richest taxpayers.
For income shares the mean (absolute) policy e¤ect expressed relative to the mean
(absolute) total change is lower, but still substantial and ranges between 11% to 29%.
Here, among all taxpayers the relative importance of the policy e¤ect is smallest for
those in the top 1% which again reects the fact that pre-tax income growth was
the main driver of their rising post-tax income shares. These ndings are in line with
Poterba (2007) who shows that the e¤ect of changes in pre-tax incomes on the post-tax
income distribution was four times as large as tax policy changes in the early 2000s.
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Table 1: Relative importance of policy e¤ect
ETI=0 ETI=1 ETI=0 ETI=1
Av. tax rates Income shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P20-40 50.8 41.9 21.4 32.2
P40-60 77.9 62.5 17.4 29.4
P60-80 87.0 78.2 15.8 26.1
P80-90 96.2 87.6 12.4 20.9
P90-95 98.3 83.6 20.4 33.5
P95-99 99.0 85.1 29.3 40.5
P99-99.5 80.4 71.6 11.9 18.1
P99.5-99.9 73.4 64.5 13.9 23.1
P99.9-99.99 75.5 68.2 12.1 21.6
P99.99-100 69.3 57.3 10.9 20.8
Top 20% 94.6 87.9 19.2 28.3
Top 10% 92.1 85.8 15.9 26.0
Top 5% 89.0 83.0 14.2 24.8
Top 1% 77.5 69.4 12.5 22.4
Note: The mean of the absolute values of the policy e¤ect is expressed in % of the mean of
the absolute values of the total e¤ect. Average tax rates (%) include federal and state level
income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Ranking based
on pre-tax income excl. capital gains. ETI = elasticity of taxable income. Sources: Own
calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
4.3 Indirect policy e¤ects
The baseline decomposition presented above singled out the direct policy e¤ect; thereby
ruling out potential behavioral responses to tax policy changes. These were captured
by the other e¤ect together with non-tax related changes to the income distribution.
However, behavioral responses to tax policy are potentially large. In order to addition-
ally identify indirect policy e¤ects in our decomposition framework, it is necessary to
make assumptions about potential behavioral changes of taxpayers after policy changes
since we are lacking a tractable full general equilibrium model. We proceed as follows.
We extend our (mechanical) baseline decomposition and retrieve hypothetical pre-tax
incomes for each income group in both counterfactuals by accounting for the ETI. Fol-
lowing Giertz (2009), who studies how tax revenues could be a¤ected by behavioral
responses after an expiration of the Bush tax cuts, we use stylized values of the ETI of
0.2, 0.5 and 1.0 (which are in the middle-low, middle-high and very high range of exist-
ing estimates for the US see Saez et al. 2012 who report a preferred value of 0.25) in
order to consider a reasonable range of values for the indirect policy e¤ect (Saez et al.
2012). Note that our baseline decomposition can be considered as a lower bound as
it is implicitly based on the assumption of a zero ETI. For the sake of simplicity and
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due to missing estimates, we follow Giertz (2009) and assume the ETI to be constant
across income groups and over time. We are thus able to quantify what fraction of the
total change in pre-tax income from period t to t+1 is due to behavioral responses and
other factors, respectively. The indirect policy e¤ect is derived such that it precisely
corresponds to that fraction of the other e¤ect (see Appendix A.1 for a formal deriva-
tion). It is important to note, that the decomposition of the other e¤ect into an indirect
policy e¤ect and a residual e¤ect rests upon the assumption that the ETI captures all
indirect policy e¤ects such as behavioral responses and general equilibrium e¤ects.18
If this is not the case, the residual e¤ect still contains further indirect policy e¤ects.
Under the strong and arguably implausible assumption that there are no exogenous
changes to the income distribution, the total change in inequality would be due to tax
policy changes.
Table 4 (Appendix A.2) shows decomposition results for all major tax reforms in
our sample period including indirect policy e¤ects. Columns (1)(5) correspond to the
baseline decomposition (Table 3), while columns (6)(11) report results for indirect and
residual e¤ects. Note that the direct policy e¤ect from our baseline (column (4)) is
not a¤ected by the extension as it mechanically captures changes in policy parameters,
but no behavioral responses. On average, for an ETI of 0.2, indirect policy e¤ects are
much smaller than direct policy e¤ects. They become larger if we assume an ETI of
0.5 and are often as important as direct policy e¤ects for an ETI of 1.
In Figure 6, we relate the direct policy e¤ect (equivalent to the right-hand side
graph in Figure 4) to the upper bound estimate of the total policy e¤ect which is given
as the sum of direct and indirect policy e¤ects. Results based on an underlying ETI of
0.2 and 0.5 are presented in Figures 7 and 8 in Appendix A.2. Importantly, our baseline
results are quantitatively a¤ected, but not qualitatively.19 Over the whole time period,
taxpayers in the top quintile beneted most from tax policy and this e¤ect is larger
the higher the underlying ETI. The opposite e¤ect can be observed for taxpayers in
the second to fourth quintile.
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 1, the upper bound estimate for the total policy
e¤ect (ETI=1) is expressed in relation to the total change in average tax rates and
income shares. While the fraction becomes smaller for average tax rates when indirect
policy e¤ects are accounted for (column (2) vs. (1)), the overall impact of tax policy
18By assuming a value for the ETI, it is clear that we cannot separate real responses from timing
or income shifting responses. In addition, the ETI is not suppossed to capture general equilibrium
e¤ects. Yet, an ETI of unity seems very high. Hence, one may argue that this serves as an upper
bound potentially capturing also (some) general equilibrium e¤ects. Furthermore, some of those e¤ects
might actually work in the other direction dampening the e¤ect of tax policy on inequality.
19An exception is the upper bound estimate on the total policy e¤ect for taxpayers in the second
quintile which turns out to be more negative than for taxpayers in the third quintile (Figure 6). For
the total policy e¤ect, it is important to note that a substantial part of the behavioral responses,
in particular around TRA86, consisted of avoidance and timing responses which do not imply any
additional income.
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P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100
Note: P20-40: Second quintile, P40-60: Third quintile, P60-80: Fourth quintile. P80-100:
Fifth quintile. The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant
changes in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER
classication). ETI = 1. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own
calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
on inequality becomes larger which amplies the direct e¤ect. It now ranges between
18% and 41%.
4.4 Sensitivity checks
In this section, we check the sensitivity of our results with respect to several choices
made.
Choice of the uprating factor. As a rst sensitivity check, we replicate the analysis
with mean nominal wage growth as uprating factor ( in formulae (2) and (3)) in order
to answer the question to what extent our results depend on the choice of the uprating
factor. Over the whole sample period, mean nominal wages grew faster than the
ination rate which implies that taxpayers might move into higher/lower tax brackets
when adjusting pre-tax incomes in our counterfactuals.20 Figure 9 (Appendix A.2)
shows that results do not change much with nominal wage indexation. The overall
e¤ect of tax policy is slightly more disequalizing than in our baseline. Cumulative
20We choose the National Average Wage Index according to which the taxable maximum for So-
cial Security is automatically adjusted. See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/AWI.html for further
information. If the consumer price index (CPIURS) and the National Average Wage Index are
normalized to 1 for the base year 1979, their 2007 values are 2.66 and 3.52, respectively.
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policy e¤ects on income shares are more benecial for taxpayers in the fourth and fth
quintile relative to those in the the second and third quintile.
Ranking of tax units. In our baseline, we follow the approach of Piketty and Saez
(2007) and rank tax units based on their pre-tax incomes excluding capital gains given
that realized capital gains are not a regular stream of income. Capital gains are added
back to pre- and post-tax incomes for the calculation of average tax rates and income
shares. This might a¤ect our results in particular for those periods in which signicant
changes in the amount of realized capital gains occurred, as can be observed around
TRA86. Table 5 (Appendix A.2) shows decomposition results for TRA86 when tax
units are ranked based on pre-tax incomes including capital gains. For the base year
1986, average tax rates appear to be substantially higher for taxpayers at the top 0.1%
of the distribution than in our baseline (Table 3), whereas for 1988 average tax rates
for the richest tax units are similar to those in our baseline. These di¤erences can be
explained by the fact that realizations of longterm capital gains peaked in 1986, in
particular among a­ uent taxpayers, in anticipation of the tax increase in 1987.
The ranking of tax units also a¤ects our decomposition results. This is especially
evident when hypothetical average tax rates with 1986 pre-tax incomes and 1988 policy
rules are compared (column (3) in Tables 3 and 5). The counterfactual average tax rate
for taxpayers at the top 0.1% is substantially higher when taxpayers are ranked based
on pre-tax incomes including capital gains. As a consequence, the benecial e¤ect of
TRA86 for the richest taxpayers (top 1%) appears to be much stronger in our baseline,
while results for the bottom 99% do not critically depend on the way tax units are
ranked. Decomposition results for all other tax reforms in our sample period are not
a¤ected by the way tax units are ranked.
SOI IRS vs. CPS data. In a previous version of this paper, we have conducted the
decomposition analysis using data from the CPS. Results are not directly comparable
due to various data issues such as the need to impute itemized deductions and top-
coding of high incomes in the CPS. As a consequence, we have relied on percentile
ratios such as the P90/P10, P90/P50 or P50/P10 and the Gini rather than (top)
income shares for the calculation of the policy e¤ect. Nevertheless, overall conclusions
are the same. The policy e¤ect is non-marginal, but smaller than the other e¤ect. Tax
policy was equalizing in the early 1990s, but highly disequalizing in the 1980s and early
2000s. A comparison of policy e¤ects on the Gini coe¢ cient based on these two data
sources is shown in Figure 10 (Appendix A.2). For most years of our sample, the policy
e¤ects are of similar size.
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5 Partisan tax policy e¤ects on inequality
The previous analysis has shown that tax policy had a di¤erential impact on inequal-
ity in di¤erent sub-periods which can be broadly classied by Republican and Demo-
crat presidencies. Therefore, one interesting question that arises from our analysis
is whether the direct policy e¤ect on inequality is signicantly a¤ected by partisan
politics. A key advantage of our direct policy e¤ect compared to other outcome vari-
ables, such as the total inequality level, is that it is solely a¤ected by policymakers
decisions and not by pre-tax incomes, behavioral responses (including labor supply,
income shifting or migration) or general equilibrium e¤ects which might be hard to
anticipate ex ante.21 Given that the policy e¤ect is calculated by holding constant the
pre-tax income distribution, it is also una¤ected by migration responses which may
counteract redistributive tax policy at the state level. We are thus able to investigate
the redistributive preferences of policymakers and hence the intendedimpact of tax
policy on the income distribution.22
In the U.S. the income tax burden is determined by both federal and state level
tax policies implying both cross-sectional as well as time variation in the policy e¤ect.
In the following analysis, we exploit this heterogeneity across states and time. We
estimate the e¤ect of the party of the U.S. President and of the legislative as well as
the executive branch of state governments on the state-level policy e¤ect calculated
for several distributional measures (i.e., state level income shares and Gini coe¢ cient).
We estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) model similar to Reed (2006) and Besley
et al. (2010). The sample consists of 28 years of observations (19802007) from 47
states. We follow Reed (2006) and exclude Alaska and Hawaii and also Nebraska given
that its state representatives do not formally a¢ liate with political parties. The main
explanatory variables of the partisan tax policy e¤ect on the U.S. income distribution
are binary variables for control over both chambers of the state legislature by the De-
mocratic or the Republican party, respectively. The omitted category is split control
between the two parties. Moreover, we include binary variables for state-year obser-
vations where a Republican governor is in power as well as for years where the U.S.
President is a Republican. For the latter two party variables, the omitted category is
Democratic Governor and Democratic President, respectively. Additionally, we con-
trol for a comprehensive set of (lagged) state and voter characteristics as well as state
xed e¤ects in order to minimize any bias which might result from unobserved voter
21This is also the reason why we use the direct and not the indirect / total policy e¤ect as our
dependent variable. However, it is possible that policymakers understand and anticipate the behavioral
and other indirect e¤ects of tax policy. This understanding (or the belief about anticipated responses)
might di¤er by party a¢ liation. However, re-estimating the model with the total policy e¤ect as
dependent variable leads to similar results.
22Clearly, tax policy changes often coincide with spending changes or are motivated by decits or
surpluses. An in-depth analysis of how our policy e¤ect is related to other policy changes is beyond
the scope of this paper but an interesting avenue for future research.
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preferences.23 Importantly, all explanatory variables are lagged by one period in order
to avoid reverse causality problems. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6. The
regression equation reads:
PEst =  +  Pst 1 + RPt 1 + Xst 1 + s + st; (4)
where PEst is the direct policy e¤ect in state s at time t, Pst 1 is a vector of (lagged)
party control variables for the state government, RPt 1 is a binary variable for a Re-
publican President, Xst 1 is a vector of controls for state and voter characteristics,
and s are state xed e¤ects. We estimate robust standard errors clustered at the
state level. In our regression model, the identifying variation comes solely from states
where partisan control over the executive or legislative branch has changed within the
period under consideration. The party a¢ liation of the state governor has changed in
all states except South Dakota which only had Republican governors. There are 7 (3)
states where the Democrats (Republicans) exclusively controlled the legislature over
the whole sample period and one state where the legislature was always split between
Democrats and Republicans with no majority for one party.
Table 2: Partisan e¤ect on inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var.: Policy e¤ect P0-20 P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100 Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Gini
Democratic Legislature 0.0097*** 0.0186*** 0.0191*** 0.0142** -0.0640*** -0.0522*** -0.0488*** -0.0527*** -0.0639***
(2.9304) (3.4759) (3.4843) (2.1890) (-3.8395) (-2.7891) (-2.7431) (-3.0280) (-4.3663)
Republican Legislature 0.0004 -0.0075 -0.0045 0.0028 0.0088 0.0300 0.0191 0.0039 0.0169
(0.1021) (-1.2398) (-0.8330) (0.4697) (0.4801) (1.3637) (0.9696) (0.2262) (0.9217)
Republican Governor -0.0085* -0.0123** -0.0045 -0.0068* 0.0315*** 0.0388*** 0.0396*** 0.0356*** 0.0440***
(-1.8579) (-2.3727) (-1.5915) (-1.8344) (3.0051) (3.8776) (3.7111) (4.0158) (3.0986)
Republican President -0.0248*** -0.0373*** -0.0325*** -0.0206*** 0.1136*** 0.0899*** 0.0537*** 0.0092 0.1164***
(-13.5782) (-12.2195) (-9.8941) (-5.2568) (11.3280) (7.2658) (4.1549) (0.9196) (11.8911)
Observations 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316
R-squared 0.1341 0.1661 0.1666 0.0668 0.1688 0.0936 0.0490 0.0467 0.1343
Mean dep. var. -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.015 0.026 0.022 0.015 0.010 0.016
Std.Dev. dep. var. 0.053 0.062 0.058 0.075 0.188 0.204 0.219 0.185 0.196
H0: Dem. L. = Rep. L. 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: In columns (1)-(8), dependent variable is the state-level policy e¤ect on the income
share of various (state-level) income groups. In column (9), dependent variable is the
state-level policy e¤ect on the Gini coe¢ cient. All specications include state xed e¤ects
and control variables as reported in Table 7. Robust standard errors clustered at the state
level. The last row shows p-values for the hypothesis test Dem:Legislature = Re p:Legislature:
Sources: See overview in Appendix A.2.
Our baseline results are presented in Table 2 (Table 7 in the Appendix reports the
full model including all control variables). Columns (1)-(8) show regression results for
the policy e¤ect on the income share of various income groups in each states income
23Our estimates might still be biased if (unobserved) time-varying state-level voter preferences (or
other factors) which are not taken up by the xed e¤ects and control variables are correlated with
both the party a¢ liation of the state government and the policy e¤ect.
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distribution while in column (9) the policy e¤ect on the Gini coe¢ cient is used as
inequality measure. Contrary to the previous analysis, non-lers are not imputed here
such that the bottom quintile consists of the poorest 20% of taxpayers in each states
income distribution. Focus rst on the partisan e¤ect of the state legislature. The
coe¢ cients for Democratic Legislature are signicant and have a positive sign when the
policy e¤ect on the income share of the bottom four quintiles is our dependent variable
(columns (1)-(4)), but a negative sign in all other specications. The within-estimator
implies that we can calculate the di¤erence between the coe¢ cients on Democratic
and Republican Legislature in order to gauge the partisan e¤ect. For example, a
change from a Republican to a Democratic state legislature, ceteris paribus, increases
the income share of taxpayers in the second and third quintile by roughly 0.02-0.03
percentage points, but decreases the income share of taxpayers in the fth quintile by
0.07 points. As a consequence, Democratic legislatures have reduced overall inequality
as shown by the negative sign of the Gini coe¢ cient in column (9). The hypothesis
test that the coe¢ cients for Democratic and Republican Legislature are equal can be
rejected at conventional levels for all specications (p-values are reported in the last
row of the table).
Turning next to the gubernatorial (state) tax policy e¤ect on inequality, we nd
that with the exception of the model in column (3), the coe¢ cients on Republican
Governor are signicant and have the opposite sign than those on Democratic Legisla-
ture implying that state income taxes had an inequality-increasing e¤ect after a switch
from a Democratic to a Republican Governor. The same conclusion can be drawn for
tax policy changes on the federal level with the Republican President time dummy be-
ing signicant and of negative sign in columns (1)-(4) and positive in columns (5)-(9),
albeit not signicant for the policy e¤ect on the income share of the top 1% in a state.
Our results suggest that tax policy of the Democrats is geared towards taxpayers up
to the fourth quintile, while Republicans seem to target taxpayers in the top quintile.
Even though our estimates appear to be small, they have a non-negligible e¤ect on
changes in inequality. The size of the coe¢ cients should be compared with the average
policy e¤ect (see bottom of Table 2) as well as the mean change in post-tax income
shares (see Table 6). In general, the political party coe¢ cients are substantially larger
than the average yearly policy e¤ect in absolute terms. We nd that the e¤ect of
controlling both chambers of the state legislature makes up 23-42% of the total change
in post-tax inequality with the largest e¤ect for the income share of taxpayers in the
second quintile. The corresponding gubernatorial e¤ect relative to the mean change
in inequality ranges between 12-37%. Hence, we conclude that partisan tax policy
has not only a statistically signicant e¤ect on U.S. income distribution, but is also
economically important.
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Sensitivity analysis. These baseline results are robust with respect to several dif-
ferent model specications. For example, we have estimated the same model including
interactions between partisan control over the legislative and the executive branch
within states or interactions between the party of the President and control of the
Congress. This does not alter the general pattern of Republicans increasing inequality
especially at the top and Democrats increasing the income share of the bottom 80%
of the distribution (results available upon request). Moreover, we have estimated a
model where the Republican President dummy is replaced by time xed e¤ects for fed-
eral legislative terms. Table 8 conrms that partisan e¤ects for state governments are
of similar size as in our baseline model. Aggregating the data to 5-year averages as sug-
gested by Reed (2006) reduces the number of state-year observations signicantly and
causes the policy e¤ect to cancel out in some of the 5-year periods. As a consequence
partisan e¤ects become smaller and less signicant (results available upon request).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed how tax policy has a¤ected post-tax income inequality
in the U.S. from 1979 to 2007 based on counterfactual simulations. The decomposition
analysis has enabled us to isolate and quantify the direct e¤ect of tax policy on the post-
tax income distribution. A main nding of our analysis is that, over the whole sample
period, tax policy aggravated the trend of growing inequality in pre-tax incomes: tax
policy had a positive (negative) e¤ect on the income share of taxpayers above (below)
the 80th percentile. Hence, without any tax policy changes, observed inequality would
be lower nowadays. A second key result is that the policy e¤ect corresponds to 11
29% of the total change in income shares of di¤erent income groups. The e¤ect was
largest for taxpayers in the 95th to 99th percentile but smallest for those in the top
1%. Thus, even though the surge in top incomes in the last three decades was to a
large extent market driven, tax policy explains a substantial part of this trend. In
addition, accounting for indirect policy e¤ects due to behavioral responses does not
change our results qualitatively, but raises the relative importance of the policy e¤ect
on inequality: the upper bound estimate for the total policy e¤ect is 1841% (depending
on the inequality measure) of the total change.
Our analysis has also shown that tax reforms in the 1980s and early 2000s exacer-
bated trends of growing inequality while those in the early 1990s beneted low-income
taxpayers. As these periods coincide with Republican and Democratic administrations,
we have additionally analyzed how the political cycle in the U.S. has a¤ected inequal-
ity. For these estimates we have exploited the fact that the policy e¤ect is independent
of all other factors beyond the control of policymakers. Our results suggest that tax
reforms passed by Republican governments had a positive e¤ect on the income shares
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of taxpayers in the top quintile, whereas Democrats targeted the bottom 80% of the
income distribution. The e¤ect of controlling either the legislative or the executive
branch of state governments accounted for 1242% of the total change in post-tax
inequality.
Our analysis has to be interpreted in the light of the following qualications. First,
our analysis is purely positive. Throughout this paper, we have abstracted from nor-
mative welfare considerations regarding the optimal amount of redistribution. Second,
the calculation of indirect policy e¤ects is based on stylized assumptions about behav-
ioral responses to tax changes. However, we have used a range of plausible parameter
values for the ETI and found qualitatively similar results. Third, we have focused the
analysis on the U.S.. In future research, it would be interesting to replicate our analy-
sis for other countries in order to investigate if (partisan) tax policy a¤ects inequality
di¤erently across di¤erent institutional settings.
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A.1 Decomposition including indirect policy e¤ect
We extend decompositions I and II as follows:
Decomposition I:
M = M [dt+1(p
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residual e¤ect I
Decomposition II:
M = M [dt+1(p
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indirect policy e¤ect II
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as vectors of hypothetical pre-tax incomes after behavioral re-
sponses. The ETI-formula reads:
" =
y
(1  T ) 
1  T
y
The behavioral response is calculated for decompositions I and II:
yI = " (1  T )  y
t+1
(1  T )t+1 (decomposition I)
yII = " (1  T )  y
t
(1  T )t (decomposition II)
with " = 0:2; 0:5 or 1, (1  T ) given by the policy e¤ect on average tax rates, T
average tax rates and yt=yt+1 observed pre-tax incomes in t and t+ 1. Averaging over





For each income group, the indirect policy e¤ect is calculated as a fraction of the
total change in reported income from period t to t+ 1:
IPE =
yS
yt+1   yt OE (7)
A.2 Additional results
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Table 3: Decomposition results for major tax reforms
(a) ERTA81
data year: 1981 1984 1981 1984 Decomp. I Decomp. II Shapley-Dec.
adjusted to: 1981 1984 Total PE OE PE OE PE OE
policy year 1981 1981 1984 1984 change Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Average tax rates
P20-40 15.1 13.8 16.2 14.9 -0.3 1.1 -1.3 1.1 -1.3 1.1 -1.3
P40-60 22.3 21.2 22.2 21.2 -1.2 -0.1 -1.1 -0.1 -1.1 -0.1 -1.1
P60-80 26.9 26.1 26.2 25.5 -1.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
P80-90 29.4 28.7 28.5 27.9 -1.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 -0.6 -0.9 -0.6
P90-95 30.6 30.0 29.4 28.9 -1.7 -1.1 -0.6 -1.2 -0.5 -1.1 -0.6
P95-99 32.5 31.7 30.7 30.0 -2.5 -1.7 -0.7 -1.8 -0.7 -1.8 -0.7
P99-99.5 36.0 35.0 33.1 32.4 -3.7 -2.6 -1.0 -2.9 -0.8 -2.8 -0.9
P99.5-99.9 39.8 39.0 36.2 35.9 -3.9 -3.1 -0.8 -3.5 -0.3 -3.3 -0.5
P99.9-99.99 44.5 46.0 40.5 42.2 -2.3 -3.9 1.6 -4.0 1.7 -3.9 1.6
P99.99-100 46.9 50.3 41.6 44.5 -2.4 -5.8 3.4 -5.3 2.9 -5.6 3.1
Top 20% 32.2 31.9 30.5 30.4 -1.8 -1.6 -0.3 -1.6 -0.2 -1.6 -0.2
Top 10% 33.7 33.6 31.7 31.6 -2.1 -1.9 -0.2 -2.0 -0.1 -2.0 -0.1
Top 5% 35.5 35.4 33.0 33.0 -2.4 -2.4 -0.0 -2.5 0.1 -2.4 0.0
Top 1% 40.1 40.6 36.6 37.2 -2.9 -3.4 0.5 -3.5 0.6 -3.5 0.6
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 8.6 8.2 8.3 8.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4
P40-60 15.7 15.2 15.5 15.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5
P60-80 25.4 25.0 25.2 24.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3
P80-90 18.0 18.1 18.0 18.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
P90-95 11.3 11.6 11.4 11.6 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
P95-99 12.1 12.6 12.3 12.8 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
P99-99.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
P99.5-99.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
P99.9-99.99 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.6 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
P99.99-100 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
Top 20% 48.1 49.9 48.7 50.4 2.3 0.6 1.8 0.5 1.8 0.5 1.8
Top 10% 30.1 31.8 30.7 32.3 2.2 0.5 1.7 0.5 1.7 0.5 1.7
Top 5% 18.8 20.2 19.3 20.7 1.9 0.5 1.4 0.5 1.4 0.5 1.4
Top 1% 6.7 7.6 7.0 7.9 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.9
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. Average tax rates (%) include federal and state
level income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources:
Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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(b) TRA86
data year: 1986 1988 1986 1988 Decomp. I Decomp. II Shapley-Dec.
adjusted to: 1986 1988 Total PE OE PE OE PE OE
policy year 1986 1986 1988 1988 change Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Average tax rates
P20-40 14.7 15.0 14.3 14.3 -0.4 -0.7 0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.2
P40-60 21.3 22.0 21.5 21.2 -0.1 -0.8 0.7 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.2
P60-80 25.9 26.7 26.0 25.6 -0.2 -1.1 0.9 0.2 -0.4 -0.5 0.2
P80-90 28.2 30.6 27.9 27.9 -0.4 -2.7 2.4 -0.3 -0.1 -1.5 1.1
P90-95 29.5 33.8 29.5 29.3 -0.2 -4.5 4.3 0.1 -0.2 -2.2 2.1
P95-99 31.0 35.8 31.0 30.1 -0.9 -5.8 4.9 0.0 -0.9 -2.9 2.0
P99-99.5 33.7 36.5 33.4 30.5 -3.2 -6.0 2.8 -0.2 -3.0 -3.1 -0.1
P99.5-99.9 38.1 39.3 36.4 30.5 -7.5 -8.7 1.2 -1.7 -5.8 -5.2 -2.3
P99.9-99.99 43.4 42.7 37.3 30.1 -13.4 -12.6 -0.7 -6.1 -7.2 -9.4 -4.0
P99.99-100 45.8 43.4 39.8 29.2 -16.6 -14.3 -2.4 -6.0 -10.6 -10.1 -6.5
Top 20% 31.3 34.9 30.6 29.3 -2.1 -5.6 3.6 -0.7 -1.4 -3.2 1.1
Top 10% 32.9 36.8 32.0 29.9 -3.0 -6.9 3.9 -0.9 -2.1 -3.9 0.9
Top 5% 34.5 38.0 33.2 30.1 -4.4 -7.9 3.5 -1.3 -3.1 -4.6 0.2
Top 1% 39.0 40.0 36.1 30.2 -8.8 -9.9 1.0 -2.9 -5.9 -6.4 -2.4
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
P40-60 14.8 14.4 14.7 13.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6
P60-80 24.6 23.7 24.5 23.0 -1.6 -0.7 -0.9 -0.1 -1.5 -0.4 -1.2
P80-90 18.0 17.1 18.1 17.0 -1.0 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 -1.1 -0.1 -1.0
P90-95 11.6 10.9 11.6 11.1 -0.5 0.2 -0.7 -0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.6
P95-99 13.1 12.6 13.0 13.1 -0.0 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.2
P99-99.5 2.6 2.9 2.6 3.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.4
P99.5-99.9 3.4 4.3 3.5 4.7 1.2 0.4 0.9 0.1 1.1 0.2 1.0
P99.9-99.99 1.7 2.9 1.9 3.3 1.6 0.4 1.2 0.2 1.4 0.3 1.3
P99.99-100 1.0 1.9 1.1 2.2 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.1 1.1 0.2 1.0
Top 20% 51.5 52.7 51.8 54.3 2.8 1.6 1.2 0.3 2.5 1.0 1.9
Top 10% 33.5 35.5 33.8 37.3 3.9 1.8 2.1 0.3 3.6 1.1 2.8
Top 5% 21.8 24.6 22.2 26.2 4.4 1.6 2.8 0.3 4.1 1.0 3.4
Top 1% 8.8 12.0 9.1 13.2 4.4 1.2 3.3 0.4 4.0 0.8 3.6
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. Average tax rates include federal and state level
income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own
calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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(c) OBRA90/OBRA93
data year: 1989 1994 1989 1994 Decomp. I Decomp. II Shapley-Dec.
adjusted to: 1989 1994 Total PE OE PE OE PE OE
policy year 1989 1989 1994 1994 change Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Average tax rates
P20-40 14.4 13.3 10.9 9.8 -4.5 -3.4 -1.1 -3.4 -1.1 -3.4 -1.1
P40-60 21.3 20.5 20.7 19.9 -1.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.5 -0.9 -0.6 -0.8
P60-80 25.7 25.9 25.9 26.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
P80-90 27.9 28.3 28.2 28.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
P90-95 29.6 30.0 30.1 30.5 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4
P95-99 30.1 30.9 31.2 31.9 1.8 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.8
P99-99.5 30.3 31.3 33.0 33.9 3.6 2.6 1.0 2.6 1.0 2.6 1.0
P99.5-99.9 30.3 31.3 36.7 37.3 7.0 6.1 0.9 6.4 0.6 6.2 0.8
P99.9-99.99 29.8 30.2 40.0 40.0 10.2 9.8 0.5 10.2 -0.0 10.0 0.2
P99.99-100 29.3 28.9 40.8 39.8 10.5 10.8 -0.3 11.5 -1.0 11.2 -0.7
Top 20% 29.3 29.9 31.5 31.9 2.6 2.0 0.6 2.2 0.4 2.1 0.5
Top 10% 29.9 30.6 33.0 33.4 3.5 2.8 0.6 3.0 0.4 2.9 0.5
Top 5% 30.1 30.8 34.1 34.6 4.5 3.8 0.7 4.1 0.4 3.9 0.6
Top 1% 30.0 30.7 37.2 37.4 7.4 6.7 0.7 7.2 0.2 7.0 0.4
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 7.6 7.2 8.0 7.5 -0.1 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.4
P40-60 13.9 13.5 14.1 13.7 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.4
P60-80 23.1 22.7 23.2 22.8 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.4
P80-90 17.1 17.4 17.3 17.5 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
P90-95 11.2 11.5 11.3 11.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
P95-99 13.3 13.8 13.3 13.8 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
P99-99.5 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 4.5 4.5 4.1 4.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0
P99.9-99.99 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1
P99.99-100 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1
Top 20% 54.1 54.9 53.3 54.1 0.0 -0.8 0.8 -0.9 0.9 -0.8 0.9
Top 10% 37.0 37.5 36.0 36.7 -0.3 -0.9 0.5 -1.0 0.6 -0.9 0.6
Top 5% 25.8 26.1 24.7 25.1 -0.6 -1.0 0.3 -1.0 0.4 -1.0 0.4
Top 1% 12.5 12.3 11.4 11.4 -1.1 -1.0 -0.2 -1.1 -0.1 -1.0 -0.1
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. Average tax rates include federal and state level
income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own
calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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(d) EGTRRA01/JGTRRA03
data year: 2000 2004 2000 2004 Decomp. I Decomp. II Shapley-Dec.
adjusted to: 2000 2004 Total PE OE PE OE PE OE
policy year 2000 2000 2004 2004 change Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Average tax rates
P20-40 10.5 4.4 8.7 2.3 -8.2 -2.1 -6.1 -1.8 -6.4 -2.0 -6.2
P40-60 20.9 19.3 18.6 16.7 -4.2 -2.6 -1.6 -2.3 -1.8 -2.5 -1.7
P60-80 25.9 25.3 23.9 23.2 -2.7 -2.1 -0.6 -2.0 -0.7 -2.1 -0.7
P80-90 28.5 28.0 26.2 25.6 -2.9 -2.4 -0.5 -2.3 -0.6 -2.3 -0.5
P90-95 30.6 30.3 28.2 27.7 -2.9 -2.6 -0.3 -2.4 -0.5 -2.5 -0.4
P95-99 31.9 31.6 29.8 29.2 -2.7 -2.3 -0.4 -2.2 -0.5 -2.3 -0.4
P99-99.5 33.9 34.1 31.7 31.8 -2.1 -2.4 0.3 -2.2 0.1 -2.3 0.2
P99.5-99.9 35.8 36.1 32.6 32.6 -3.2 -3.5 0.3 -3.2 -0.0 -3.4 0.2
P99.9-99.99 36.6 37.4 32.5 32.9 -3.7 -4.6 0.9 -4.0 0.3 -4.3 0.6
P99.99-100 37.2 37.0 32.8 31.8 -5.5 -5.2 -0.3 -4.4 -1.0 -4.8 -0.7
Top 20% 32.1 31.7 29.5 28.9 -3.2 -2.8 -0.4 -2.5 -0.6 -2.7 -0.5
Top 10% 33.3 33.1 30.6 30.1 -3.2 -3.0 -0.2 -2.7 -0.5 -2.8 -0.4
Top 5% 34.2 34.0 31.4 30.9 -3.2 -3.1 -0.1 -2.8 -0.4 -2.9 -0.3
Top 1% 35.9 36.2 32.5 32.3 -3.5 -3.8 0.3 -3.4 -0.2 -3.6 0.1
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
P40-60 12.4 12.5 12.4 12.4 -0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
P60-80 20.5 21.0 20.4 20.9 0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.5
P80-90 15.8 16.5 15.8 16.4 0.6 -0.1 0.6 -0.0 0.6 -0.0 0.6
P90-95 10.9 11.2 10.9 11.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P95-99 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
P99-99.5 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
P99.5-99.9 5.6 5.1 5.7 5.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.4
P99.9-99.99 4.5 3.8 4.6 3.9 -0.5 0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.6
P99.99-100 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.8 -0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
Top 20% 57.4 56.9 57.7 57.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.4
Top 10% 41.5 40.5 41.8 40.8 -0.7 0.3 -1.1 0.3 -1.0 0.3 -1.0
Top 5% 30.7 29.3 30.9 29.6 -1.1 0.3 -1.4 0.3 -1.4 0.3 -1.4
Top 1% 16.5 15.1 16.8 15.4 -1.1 0.3 -1.4 0.3 -1.4 0.3 -1.4
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. Average tax rates include federal and state level
income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own
calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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Table 4: Decomposition results for major tax reforms including indirect policy e¤ects
(a) ERTA81
data year: 1981 1984 Total ETI =0 ETI =0.2 ETI =0.5 ETI =1.0
policy year: 1981 1984 change PE OE IPE RE IPE RE IPE RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Average tax rates
P20-40 15.1 14.9 -0.3 1.1 -1.3 -0.2 -1.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.4
P40-60 22.3 21.2 -1.2 -0.1 -1.1 0.1 -1.2 0.1 -1.2 0.3 -1.4
P60-80 26.9 25.5 -1.4 -0.7 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.8 0.2 -0.9
P80-90 29.4 27.9 -1.5 -0.9 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.7
P90-95 30.6 28.9 -1.7 -1.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.7 0.3 -0.9
P95-99 32.5 30.0 -2.5 -1.8 -0.7 0.1 -0.8 0.2 -0.9 0.4 -1.1
P99-99.5 36.0 32.4 -3.7 -2.8 -0.9 0.1 -1.0 0.2 -1.1 0.4 -1.3
P99.5-99.9 39.8 35.9 -3.9 -3.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.8
P99.9-99.99 44.5 42.2 -2.3 -3.9 1.6 0.1 1.5 0.3 1.4 0.5 1.1
P99.99-100 46.9 44.5 -2.4 -5.6 3.1 0.2 2.9 0.6 2.5 1.2 2.0
Top 20% 32.2 30.4 -1.8 -1.6 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.5
Top 10% 33.7 31.6 -2.1 -2.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.4
Top 5% 35.5 33.0 -2.4 -2.4 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2
Top 1% 40.1 37.2 -2.9 -3.5 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.5
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 8.6 8.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1
P40-60 15.7 15.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.5 -0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3
P60-80 25.4 24.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3
P80-90 18.0 18.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
P90-95 11.3 11.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
P95-99 12.1 12.8 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3
P99-99.5 2.3 2.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 2.7 3.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
P99.9-99.99 1.2 1.6 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
P99.99-100 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Top 20% 48.1 50.4 2.3 0.5 1.8 0.1 1.7 0.2 1.6 0.4 1.4
Top 10% 30.1 32.3 2.2 0.5 1.7 0.1 1.6 0.2 1.5 0.4 1.3
Top 5% 18.8 20.7 1.9 0.5 1.4 0.1 1.3 0.2 1.2 0.3 1.1
Top 1% 6.7 7.9 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.7
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. IPE: Indirect policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. RE: Residual e¤ect.
ETI: Elasticity of taxable income. Results for ETI=0 correspond to the baseline results. If
ETI=0: Total change = PE + OE. If ETI > 0: PE is equal to (4). Total change = PE +
IPE + RE. Average tax rates include federal and state level income and payroll taxes.
Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI
IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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(b) TRA86
data year: 1986 1988 Total ETI =0 ETI =0.2 ETI =0.5 ETI =1.0
policy year: 1986 1988 change PE OE IPE RE IPE RE IPE RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Average tax rates
P20-40 14.7 14.3 -0.4 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
P40-60 21.3 21.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
P60-80 25.9 25.6 -0.2 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
P80-90 28.2 27.9 -0.4 -1.5 1.1 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.6
P90-95 29.5 29.3 -0.2 -2.2 2.1 0.3 1.7 0.8 1.3 1.2 0.8
P95-99 31.0 30.1 -0.9 -2.9 2.0 0.2 1.7 0.6 1.4 1.0 1.0
P99-99.5 33.7 30.5 -3.2 -3.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.4 -0.4
P99.5-99.9 38.1 30.5 -7.5 -5.2 -2.3 0.4 -2.7 0.9 -3.2 1.7 -4.1
P99.9-99.99 43.4 30.1 -13.4 -9.4 -4.0 0.2 -4.2 0.6 -4.6 1.2 -5.2
P99.99-100 45.8 29.2 -16.6 -10.1 -6.5 0.7 -7.2 1.8 -8.3 3.6 -10.0
Top 20% 31.3 29.3 -2.1 -3.2 1.1 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.7
Top 10% 32.9 29.9 -3.0 -3.9 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.6
Top 5% 34.5 30.1 -4.4 -4.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.1
Top 1% 39.0 30.2 -8.8 -6.4 -2.4 0.3 -2.7 0.7 -3.1 1.4 -3.8
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 7.8 7.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1
P40-60 14.8 13.9 -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.0 -0.6 -0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5
P60-80 24.6 23.0 -1.6 -0.4 -1.2 -0.1 -1.1 -0.2 -1.0 -0.3 -0.9
P80-90 18.0 17.0 -1.0 -0.1 -1.0 -0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.9
P90-95 11.6 11.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.8
P95-99 13.1 13.1 -0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.3
P99-99.5 2.6 3.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P99.5-99.9 3.4 4.7 1.2 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8
P99.9-99.99 1.7 3.3 1.6 0.3 1.3 0.1 1.3 0.2 1.2 0.3 1.0
P99.99-100 1.0 2.2 1.2 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.8
Top 20% 51.5 54.3 2.8 1.0 1.9 0.1 1.8 0.2 1.7 0.4 1.5
Top 10% 33.5 37.3 3.9 1.1 2.8 0.1 2.7 0.4 2.5 0.7 2.1
Top 5% 21.8 26.2 4.4 1.0 3.4 0.2 3.2 0.5 2.9 1.0 2.5
Top 1% 8.8 13.2 4.4 0.8 3.6 0.2 3.5 0.5 3.2 0.7 2.9
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. IPE: Indirect policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. RE: Residual e¤ect.
ETI: Elasticity of taxable income. Results for ETI=0 correspond to the baseline results. If
ETI=0: Total change = PE + OE. If ETI > 0: PE is equal to (4). Total change = PE +
IPE + RE. Average tax rates include federal and state level income and payroll taxes.
Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI
IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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(c) OBRA90/OBRA93
data year: 1989 1994 Total ETI =0 ETI =0.2 ETI =0.5 ETI =1.0
policy year: 1989 1994 change PE OE IPE RE IPE RE IPE RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Average tax rates
P20-40 14.4 9.8 -4.5 -3.4 -1.1 0.6 -1.7 0.9 -2.0 1.2 -2.3
P40-60 21.3 19.9 -1.4 -0.6 -0.8 0.2 -1.1 0.4 -1.2 0.5 -1.3
P60-80 25.7 26.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.0 0.2 -0.0 0.2 -0.0 0.2
P80-90 27.9 28.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 -0.0 0.4 -0.0 0.4 -0.0 0.4
P90-95 29.6 30.5 1.0 0.5 0.4 -0.0 0.4 -0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.5
P95-99 30.1 31.9 1.8 1.0 0.8 -0.0 0.8 -0.0 0.8 -0.0 0.8
P99-99.5 30.3 33.9 3.6 2.6 1.0 -0.2 1.1 -0.3 1.3 -0.5 1.4
P99.5-99.9 30.3 37.3 7.0 6.2 0.8 -0.2 0.9 -0.3 1.1 -0.4 1.2
P99.9-99.99 29.8 40.0 10.2 10.0 0.2 -0.3 0.5 -0.5 0.7 -0.7 0.9
P99.99-100 29.3 39.8 10.5 11.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.9 0.3 -1.3 0.6
Top 20% 29.3 31.9 2.6 2.1 0.5 -0.0 0.5 -0.1 0.6 -0.1 0.6
Top 10% 29.9 33.4 3.5 2.9 0.5 -0.1 0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.2 0.7
Top 5% 30.1 34.6 4.5 3.9 0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.2 0.8 -0.3 0.9
Top 1% 30.0 37.4 7.4 7.0 0.4 -0.2 0.6 -0.3 0.8 -0.5 1.0
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 7.6 7.5 -0.1 0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5
P40-60 13.9 13.7 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
P60-80 23.1 22.8 -0.2 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
P80-90 17.1 17.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
P90-95 11.2 11.6 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P95-99 13.3 13.8 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
P99-99.5 3.1 3.1 0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 4.5 4.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.3
P99.9-99.99 3.0 2.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.2
P99.99-100 1.9 1.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1
Top 20% 54.1 54.1 0.0 -0.8 0.9 -0.0 0.9 -0.1 1.0 -0.1 1.0
Top 10% 37.0 36.7 -0.3 -0.9 0.6 -0.3 0.9 -0.4 1.0 -0.5 1.1
Top 5% 25.8 25.1 -0.6 -1.0 0.4 -0.4 0.7 -0.6 0.9 -0.7 1.0
Top 1% 12.5 11.4 -1.1 -1.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.4 -0.8 0.7
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. IPE: Indirect policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. RE: Residual e¤ect.
ETI: Elasticity of taxable income. Results for ETI=0 correspond to the baseline results. If
ETI=0: Total change = PE + OE. If ETI > 0: PE is equal to (4). Total change = PE +
IPE + RE. Average tax rates include federal and state level income and payroll taxes.
Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI
IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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(d) EGTRRA01/JGTRRA03
data year: 2000 2004 Total ETI =0 ETI =0.2 ETI =0.5 ETI =1.0
policy year: 2000 2004 change PE OE IPE RE IPE RE IPE RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Average tax rates
P20-40 10.5 2.3 -8.2 -2.0 -6.2 0.2 -6.4 0.4 -6.6 0.7 -7.0
P40-60 20.9 16.7 -4.2 -2.5 -1.7 0.5 -2.3 0.8 -2.5 1.0 -2.7
P60-80 25.9 23.2 -2.7 -2.1 -0.7 0.4 -1.0 0.4 -1.1 0.5 -1.1
P80-90 28.5 25.6 -2.9 -2.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.7
P90-95 30.6 27.7 -2.9 -2.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5
P95-99 31.9 29.2 -2.7 -2.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.6
P99-99.5 33.9 31.8 -2.1 -2.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
P99.5-99.9 35.8 32.6 -3.2 -3.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.0
P99.9-99.99 36.6 32.9 -3.7 -4.3 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.4
P99.99-100 37.2 31.8 -5.5 -4.8 -0.7 0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.9 0.4 -1.1
Top 20% 32.1 28.9 -3.2 -2.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.6
Top 10% 33.3 30.1 -3.2 -2.8 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.5
Top 5% 34.2 30.9 -3.2 -2.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.4
Top 1% 35.9 32.3 -3.5 -3.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 7.3 7.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
P40-60 12.4 12.4 -0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1
P60-80 20.5 20.9 0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.6 -0.2 0.6
P80-90 15.8 16.4 0.6 -0.0 0.6 -0.0 0.6 -0.0 0.6 -0.0 0.6
P90-95 10.9 11.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P95-99 14.2 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0
P99-99.5 3.6 3.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
P99.5-99.9 5.6 5.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.5
P99.9-99.99 4.5 3.9 -0.5 0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.7
P99.99-100 2.8 2.8 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.3
Top 20% 57.4 57.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5
Top 10% 41.5 40.8 -0.7 0.3 -1.0 0.1 -1.1 0.2 -1.2 0.2 -1.2
Top 5% 30.7 29.6 -1.1 0.3 -1.4 0.1 -1.5 0.2 -1.6 0.3 -1.6
Top 1% 16.5 15.4 -1.1 0.3 -1.4 0.1 -1.5 0.2 -1.6 0.3 -1.7
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. IPE: Indirect policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. RE: Residual e¤ect.
ETI: Elasticity of taxable income. Results for ETI=0 correspond to the baseline results. If
ETI=0: Total change = PE + OE. If ETI > 0: PE is equal to (4). Total change = PE +
IPE + RE. Average tax rates include federal and state level income and payroll taxes.
Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI
IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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Table 5: Robustness check: Ranking of taxunits, TRA86
data year: 1986 1988 1986 1988 Decomp. I Decomp. II Shapley-Dec.
adjusted to: 1986 1988 Total PE OE PE OE PE OE
policy year 1986 1986 1988 1988 change Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Average tax rates
P20-40 14.5 15.0 13.6 14.1 -0.4 -0.8 0.5 -0.9 0.5 -0.9 0.5
P40-60 21.4 22.1 21.1 21.2 -0.1 -0.9 0.7 -0.3 0.1 -0.6 0.4
P60-80 25.6 26.7 25.6 25.6 -0.0 -1.1 1.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.6 0.5
P80-90 28.2 30.6 27.7 27.8 -0.3 -2.8 2.5 -0.5 0.1 -1.6 1.3
P90-95 29.2 33.8 29.2 29.2 0.1 -4.6 4.7 0.0 0.0 -2.3 2.3
P95-99 30.6 35.6 30.7 29.9 -0.7 -5.7 5.0 0.1 -0.8 -2.8 2.1
P99-99.5 33.1 36.4 33.8 30.5 -2.6 -5.9 3.3 0.7 -3.3 -2.6 -0.0
P99.5-99.9 38.0 39.3 36.1 30.5 -7.5 -8.8 1.3 -1.9 -5.6 -5.4 -2.1
P99.9-99.99 45.5 41.5 44.4 30.0 -15.5 -11.5 -4.0 -1.1 -14.4 -6.3 -9.2
P99.99-100 48.6 37.9 52.3 29.3 -19.3 -8.5 -10.7 3.7 -23.0 -2.4 -16.9
Top 20% 31.5 34.7 31.3 29.2 -2.3 -5.5 3.2 -0.2 -2.1 -2.8 0.5
Top 10% 33.1 36.4 33.1 29.8 -3.3 -6.6 3.3 -0.0 -3.3 -3.3 0.0
Top 5% 35.0 37.4 34.9 30.1 -4.9 -7.4 2.4 -0.0 -4.9 -3.7 -1.2
Top 1% 40.2 39.0 40.0 30.2 -10.0 -8.8 -1.2 -0.2 -9.9 -4.5 -5.5
Post-tax income shares
P20-40 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2
P40-60 14.7 14.3 14.7 13.8 -0.9 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.9 -0.2 -0.6
P60-80 24.5 23.6 24.5 22.9 -1.6 -0.7 -0.9 -0.0 -1.6 -0.4 -1.3
P80-90 18.0 17.1 18.1 16.9 -1.0 -0.1 -0.9 0.1 -1.1 -0.0 -1.0
P90-95 11.6 10.9 11.6 11.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.8 -0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.6
P95-99 13.1 12.7 13.0 13.1 -0.0 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2
P99-99.5 2.7 3.0 2.6 3.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 -0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4
P99.5-99.9 3.3 4.4 3.4 4.7 1.4 0.4 1.1 0.1 1.3 0.2 1.2
P99.9-99.99 2.0 3.1 2.0 3.5 1.6 0.4 1.2 0.0 1.5 0.2 1.3
P99.99-100 1.2 2.4 1.1 2.6 1.4 0.2 1.2 -0.1 1.5 0.0 1.3
Top 20% 51.9 53.5 51.9 55.0 3.1 1.6 1.6 -0.0 3.1 0.8 2.4
Top 10% 33.9 36.4 33.8 38.1 4.2 1.7 2.5 -0.1 4.3 0.8 3.4
Top 5% 22.3 25.5 22.2 27.0 4.7 1.5 3.2 -0.1 4.8 0.7 4.0
Top 1% 9.1 12.8 9.1 13.9 4.8 1.1 3.7 0.0 4.8 0.5 4.2
Note: PE: Policy e¤ect. OE: Other e¤ect. Average tax rates (%) include federal and state
level income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Ranking
based on pre-tax income incl. capital gains. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS
income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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Total policy  ef f ect
P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100
Note: P20-40: Second quintile, P40-60: Third quintile, P60-80: Fourth quintile. P80-100:
The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant changes in tax
legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classication). ETI =
0.2. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based on
SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100
Note: P20-40: Second quintile, P40-60: Third quintile, P60-80: Fourth quintile. P80-100:
The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant changes in tax
legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classication). ETI
= 0.5. Uprating according to the level of price ination. Sources: Own calculations based
on SOI IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
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P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100
Note: P20-40: Second quintile, P40-60: Third quintile, P60-80: Fourth quintile. P80-100:
The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signicant changes in tax
legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classication).
Uprating according to mean nominal wage growth. Sources: Own calculations based on SOI
IRS income tax return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.

















































Policy effect Gini - SOI
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data, CPS data and NBER
TAXSIM calculator.
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Data sources: Partisan regressions
State political variables. State political variables are from Klarner (2003), as well as
updates available on the State Politics and Policy Web Site.
(http://academic.udayton.edu/SPPQ-TPR/klarner_datapage.html, accessed at January
15th, 2013). ADA Average is from Anderson and Habel (2009).
State economic variables. The series on direct policy e¤ects as well as post-tax in-
equality measures result from own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return data and
NBER TAXSIM calculator. Data on state per capita personal income, farm and manufac-
turing share is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Other state characteristics variables. State characteristics such as percent elderly,
percent black, percent female and percent college-educated are based on information con-
tained in IPUMS CPS. Data on union density is from Hirsch et al. (2001), with updates
available on http://unionstats.gsu.edu/MonthlyLaborReviewArticle.htm (accessed at Janu-
ary 15th, 2013). Population density is provided by the Census Bureau.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics: Partisan regressions
Post-tax inequality Mean StdDev Mean change StdDev Mean PE StdDev
P0-20 3.456 0.606 -0.023 0.626 -0.003 0.053
P20-40 8.710 1.064 -0.062 0.819 -0.001 0.062
P40-60 14.555 1.680 -0.096 1.203 -0.007 0.058
P60-80 23.107 2.395 -0.118 1.727 -0.015 0.075
P80-100 50.172 4.990 0.299 3.435 0.026 0.188
Top 10% 34.442 6.444 0.318 4.610 0.022 0.204
Top 5% 23.462 6.793 0.296 4.916 0.015 0.219
Top 1% 10.656 5.520 0.244 3.964 0.010 0.185
Gini 48.683 5.141 0.301 3.655 0.016 0.196
Pol. party variables Mean StdDev Min Max
Democratic Legislature 50.24 50.02 0 100
Republican Legislature 27.92 44.87 0 100
Republican Governor 46.41 49.89 0 100
Dem. Gov. and Leg. 28.83 45.31 0 100
Rep. Gov. and Leg. 16.79 37.39 0 100
Republican President 55.59 49.70 0 100
Rep. Pres. and Congress 16.68 37.29 0 100
State charact. variables Mean StdDev Min Max
Log of Real PCPI 3.19 0.20 2.69 3.82
ADA Average 41.92 21.70 -5.02 90.85
Percent Elderaly 11.93 1.91 5.85 18.39
Percent Black 10.39 9.76 0 41.23
Percent Female 51.14 1.01 47.73 54.33
Percent College-Educated 12.09 6.80 1.57 31.35
Percent Union 14.58 6.90 2.30 38.30
Population Density 177.07 240.12 4.55 1176.33
Farm share 1.24 1.68 0 16.38
Manufacturing share 13.36 6.29 2.62 35.70
Unemployment rate 6.06 2.08 2.30 17.40
Note: StdDev: Standard deviation. PE: Policy e¤ect. PCPI: Per Capita Personal Income.
ADA: Average: average Americans for Democratic Action score. Sources: See overview in
Appendix A.2.
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Table 7: Partisan e¤ect on inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var.: Policy e¤ect P0-20 P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100 Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Gini
Democratic Legislature 0.0097*** 0.0186*** 0.0191*** 0.0142** -0.0640*** -0.0522*** -0.0488*** -0.0527*** -0.0639***
(2.9304) (3.4759) (3.4843) (2.1890) (-3.8395) (-2.7891) (-2.7431) (-3.0280) (-4.3663)
Republican Legislature 0.0004 -0.0075 -0.0045 0.0028 0.0088 0.0300 0.0191 0.0039 0.0169
(0.1021) (-1.2398) (-0.8330) (0.4697) (0.4801) (1.3637) (0.9696) (0.2262) (0.9217)
Republican Governor -0.0085* -0.0123** -0.0045 -0.0068* 0.0315*** 0.0388*** 0.0396*** 0.0356*** 0.0440***
(-1.8579) (-2.3727) (-1.5915) (-1.8344) (3.0051) (3.8776) (3.7111) (4.0158) (3.0986)
Republican President -0.0248*** -0.0373*** -0.0325*** -0.0206*** 0.1136*** 0.0899*** 0.0537*** 0.0092 0.1164***
(-13.5782) (-12.2195) (-9.8941) (-5.2568) (11.3280) (7.2658) (4.1549) (0.9196) (11.8911)
Log of Real PCPI -0.0658*** -0.0429 -0.0380 0.0217 0.1390 0.0259 0.0785 0.0261 0.0950
(-3.3363) (-1.2625) (-1.2704) (0.6395) (1.3944) (0.2113) (0.6411) (0.2597) (0.8930)
ADA score 0.0002* 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0002 -0.0017*** -0.0013** -0.0006 -0.0009** -0.0017***
(1.8363) (3.8073) (3.6215) (0.9981) (-3.8563) (-2.5311) (-1.1679) (-2.0754) (-3.9179)
Percent Elderly 0.0004 0.0024 -0.0014 -0.0029 0.0013 0.0012 0.0065 -0.0011 -0.0025
(0.2088) (1.1311) (-0.9932) (-1.4651) (0.2670) (0.2156) (0.9394) (-0.2114) (-0.3818)
Percent Black -0.0020*** 0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0010 0.0016 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0007
(-3.3933) (0.9486) (-0.1640) (-0.6286) (0.4662) (-0.0668) (0.2430) (-0.6122) (-0.1947)
Percent Female -0.0012 -0.0054** -0.0009 0.0017 0.0058 0.0100 0.0005 0.0014 0.0103
(-0.9285) (-2.3406) (-0.4651) (0.6443) (0.8589) (1.2314) (0.0605) (0.2085) (1.4178)
Percent College-Educated 0.0020*** 0.0011* 0.0020*** 0.0021*** -0.0074*** -0.0035* -0.0043* -0.0050*** -0.0036**
(5.9181) (1.9144) (4.1106) (3.3681) (-4.3228) (-1.6797) (-1.9517) (-2.7186) (-2.0838)
Percent Union 0.0010* -0.0043*** -0.0010 0.0032*** 0.0018 0.0040 0.0055** 0.0047** 0.0078***
(1.7971) (-4.6091) (-1.3845) (3.5147) (0.7451) (1.6390) (2.0904) (2.3850) (3.0533)
Population Density 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002* 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0000
(0.9028) (0.5573) (-0.4598) (-1.9669) (0.4691) (0.7293) (-0.2867) (1.4003) (-0.0737)
Farm Share 0.0028* 0.0061** 0.0023 0.0004 -0.0116 -0.0189*** -0.0112*** -0.0064 -0.0152*
(1.6789) (2.2877) (0.8852) (0.1390) (-1.4453) (-2.8599) (-2.7930) (-1.5923) (-1.9046)
Manufacturing Share -0.0000 0.0013 0.0016** 0.0003 -0.0032 -0.0020 -0.0043 -0.0061** -0.0050**
(-0.0362) (1.6078) (2.3104) (0.3659) (-1.6528) (-0.6898) (-1.1151) (-2.3514) (-2.2352)
Unemployment rate -0.0020** 0.0011 -0.0027* -0.0008 0.0046 -0.0016 -0.0060 -0.0085 -0.0022
(-2.2448) (0.6982) (-1.7104) (-0.3965) (0.8518) (-0.2871) (-1.0017) (-1.5699) (-0.4290)
Post-tax inequality -0.0187*** -0.0048* -0.4596*** -0.4633*** -0.0051*** -0.0038** -0.0041*** -0.0035** -0.0040**
(-4.5332) (-1.8952) (-3.1146) (-3.2794) (-2.9314) (-2.4787) (-2.8608) (-2.5967) (-2.3004)
Observations 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316
R-squared 0.1341 0.1661 0.1666 0.0668 0.1688 0.0936 0.0490 0.0467 0.1343
Mean dep. var. -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.015 0.026 0.022 0.015 0.010 0.016
Std.Dev. dep. var. 0.053 0.062 0.058 0.075 0.188 0.204 0.219 0.185 0.196
H0: Dem. L. = Rep. L. 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: In columns (1)-(8), dependent variable is the state-level policy e¤ect on the income
share of various income groups. In column (9), dependent variable is the state-level policy
e¤ect on the Gini coe¢ cient. All specications include state xed e¤ects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the state level. The last row shows p-values for the hypothesis test
Dem:Legislature = Re p:Legislature: PCPI: Per Capita Personal Income. ADA: average
Americans for Democratic Action score. Sources: See overview in Appendix A.2.
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Table 8: Partisan regressions with time xed e¤ects for federal legislative terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var.: Policy e¤ect P0-20 P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-100 Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Gini
Democratic Legislature 0.0083*** 0.0149*** 0.0164*** 0.0117* -0.0516*** -0.0436** -0.0430** -0.0502*** -0.0514***
(3.3880) (3.2595) (3.5028) (1.8596) (-3.9610) (-2.4779) (-2.6033) (-2.8527) (-4.3396)
Republican Legislature 0.0017 0.0022 0.0007 0.0033 -0.0088 0.0083 -0.0023 -0.0183 -0.0094
(0.6304) (0.5309) (0.1431) (0.5785) (-0.6150) (0.4527) (-0.1277) (-1.1160) (-0.6565)
Republican Governor -0.0066 -0.0095** -0.0037 -0.0088** 0.0278*** 0.0359*** 0.0372*** 0.0339*** 0.0363***
(-1.6479) (-2.4573) (-1.5035) (-2.1417) (3.4385) (3.5943) (3.2381) (3.4245) (3.1581)
Observations 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316
R-squared 0.2105 0.3127 0.2711 0.2029 0.3407 0.2289 0.1670 0.1750 0.2956
Mean dep. var. -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.015 0.026 0.022 0.015 0.010 0.016
Std.Dev. dep. var. 0.053 0.062 0.058 0.075 0.188 0.204 0.219 0.185 0.196
H0: Dem. L. = Rep. L. 0.027 0.010 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.041 0.001
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: In columns (1)-(8), dependent variable is the state-level policy e¤ect on the income
share of various income groups. In column (9), dependent variable is the state-level policy
e¤ect on the Gini coe¢ cient. All specications include state xed e¤ects and federal
legislative term dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. The last row
shows p-values for the hypothesis test Dem:Legislature = Re p:Legislature: Sources: See
overview in Appendix A.2.
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Table 9: Tax Legislation
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 26 16 16 16 13 14
Lowest individual income tax rate** 14%*** 14%*** 14%*** 13.83%*** 12%*** 11%***
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket
$2,200-$2,700 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$3,200-$4200 $3,400-$5500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, ****
15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 25,
28, 32, 36, 39, 42, 45,
48, 50, 53, 55, 58, 60,
62, 64, 66, 68, 69,
16, 18, 21, 24, 28,
32 37, 43, 49, 54,
59, 64, 68
16, 18, 21, 24, 28, 32
37, 43, 49, 54, 59, 64,
68
16, 18, 21, 24, 28,
32 37, 43, 49, 54,
59, 64, 68
14, 16, 19, 22, 25,
29, 33, 39, 44, 49
13, 15, 17, 19, 23,
26, 30, 35, 40, 44,
48
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate
70% 70% 70% 70% 50% 50%
Rate on long-term capital gains












Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and
itemized deductions



































1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Child and dependent care tax credit
(non-refundable)*****
$400 for each of first 2
dependents, maximum
20% of expenditures










for credit is $2,400
for one child,






for credit is $2,400
for one child,






for credit is $2,400
for one child,




EITC rate and maximum credit 10%, max. $400 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500












So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 10.1% 10.16% 10.16% 10.7% 10.8% 10.8%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 17,700 22,900 25,900 29,700 32,400 35,700
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 17,700 22,900 25,900 29,700 32,400 35,700
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 15 15 15 5 4 4
Lowest individual income tax rate** 11%*** 11%*** 11%*** 11% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket
$2,300-$3,400 $2,390-$3,540 $2,480-$3,670 $0-$1,800 $0-$17,850 $0-$18,550
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$3,400-$5,500 $3,540-$5,720 $3,670-$5,940 $0-$3,000 $0-$29,750 $0-$30,950
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, ****
12, 14, 16, 18, 22,
25, 28, 33, 38, 42,
45, 49
12, 14, 16, 18, 22,
25, 28, 33, 38, 42,
45, 49
12, 14, 16, 18, 22,
25, 28, 33, 38, 42,
45, 49
15, 28, 35 28, 33 28, 33
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate
50% 50% 50% 38.5% 28% 28%









Ordinary rates Ordinary rates Ordinary rates
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and
itemized deductions








































1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.




for credit is $2,400
for one child,






for credit is $2,400
for one child,






for credit is $2,400
for one child,






for credit is $2,400
for one child,






for credit is $2,400
for one child,





eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum
credit is 20%-30% of
expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit 10%, max. $500 11%, max. $550 11%, max. $550
14%, max. $851,
indexed for inflation 14%, max. $874 14%, max. $910














So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 12.12% 12.12%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.6% 2.7% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 37,800 39,600 42,000 43,800 45,000 48,000
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 37,800 39,600 42,000 43,800 45,000 48,000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 4 3 3 5 5 5
Lowest individual income tax rate** 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket
$0-$19,450 $0-$20,350 $0-$21,450 $0-$22,100 $0-$22,750 $0-$23,350
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$0-$32,450 $0-$34,000 $0-$35,800 $0-$36,900 $0-$38,000 $0-$39,999
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, ****
28, 33 28 28 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate
28% 31% 31% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Rate on long-term capital gains 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15%
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates













































$30,000 for single filers,














1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.




for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800





eligible for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800 for
two or more; maximimum




for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800






for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800





eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,
$4,800 for two or
more; maximimum




for credit is $2,400
for one child, $4,800



























































So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 51,300 53,400 55,500 57,600 60,600 61,200
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 51,300 125,000 130,200 135,000 no max. no max.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 5 5 5 5 5 5
Lowest individual income tax rate** 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket
$0-$24,000 $0-$24,650 $0-$25,350 $0-$25,750 $0-$26,250 $0-$27,050
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$0-$40,100 $0-$41,200 $0-$42,350 $0-$43,050 $0-$43,850 $0-$45,200
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, ****
28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 27.5, 30.5, 35.5
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.10%
Rate on long-term capital gains 28% and 15%
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in the
15% bracket or below,
20% for others
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates





















$4,000 (single person) /
$6,700 (married couple)
$4,150 (single person) /
$6,900 (married couple)
$4,250 (single person) /
$7,100 (married couple)
$4,300 (single person) /
$7,200 (married couple)
$4,400 (single person) /
$7,350 (married couple)
$4,550 (single person) /
$7,600 (married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers,
$45,000 for joint filers
$35,750 for single filers,
$49,000 for joint filers
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit N.A. $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable)





Child and dependent care tax credit
(non-refundable)*****
Maximum expenditure
eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,





eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,





eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,





eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,





eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,





eligible for credit is
$2,400 for one child,











































































So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 62,700 65,400 68,400 72,600 76,200 80,400
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] no max. no max. no max. no max. no max. no max.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
In c o m e  Tax
Number of tax brackets* 6 6 6 6 6 6
Lowest individual income tax rate** 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Lowest individual income single tax
bracket $0-$6,000 $0-$7,000 $0-$7,150 $0-$7,300 $0-$7,550 $0-$7,825
Lowest individual income joint tax
bracket
$0-$12,000 $0-$14,000 $0-$14,300 $0-$14,600 $0-$15,100 $0-$15,650
Other individual income tax brackets
(percent)*, **** 15, 27, 30, 35 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33
Highest individual income tax bracket
rate
38.6% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%
Rate on long-term capital gains
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets




Rate on dividends  = individual rates
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
































$4,700 (single person) /
$7,850 (married couple)
$4,750 (single person) /
$9,500 (married couple)
$4,850 (single person) /
$9,700 (married couple)
$5,000 (single person) /
$10,000 (married
couple)







$35,750 for single filers,
$49,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers,
$58,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers,
$58,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers,
$58,000 for joint filers
$42,500 for single filers,





2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Tax c re d its
Child tax credit
600$, refundable up to
10% earned income
above $10,350
1,000$, refundable up to
10% earned income
above $10,500




to 15% earned income
above $11,000







Child and dependent care tax credit (non-
refundable)*****
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for 1
child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for 1
child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit
is 35% (phasing down
to 20% at $15,000 of
AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000 for
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or
more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible
expenses are $3,000
for 1 child; $6,000 for
2 or more; maximum
credit is 35%
(phasing down to
20% at $15,000 of
AGI)












































































$2,000 for joint filers.
7.65%/15.98%/
21.06%
So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 84,900 87,000 87,900 90,000 94,200 97,500
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] no max. no max. no max. no max. no max. no max.
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2008 2009 2008 2009
In c o m e  Tax So c ia l Se c u rity  [a]
Number of tax brackets* 6 6 Social Security tax rate (OASDI) 12.4% 12.4%
Lowest individual income
tax rate**
10% 10% Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) 2.9% 2.9%
Lowest individual income
single tax bracket
$0-$8,025 $0-$8,350 OASDI taxable maximum earnings 102,000 106,800
Lowest individual income
joint tax bracket
$0-$16,050 $0-$16,700 HI taxable maximum earnings no max. no max.
Other individual income tax
brackets (percent)*, **** 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 Tax c re d its
Highest individual income
tax bracket rate 35% 35% Child tax credit
1,000$, refundable up to 15%
earned income above $8,500
1,000$, refundable up to 15%
earned income above $3,000
Rate on long-term capital
gains
0% for taxpayers in the 10%
and 15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
0% for taxpayers in the
10% and 15% bracket;
15% for other brackets
Child and dependent care tax
credit (non-refundable)*****
Maximum eligible expenses are
$3,000 for 1 child; $6,000 for
2 or more; maximum credit is
35% (phasing down to 20% at
$15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible expenses are
$3,000 for 1 child; $6,000 for 2
or more; maximum credit is 35%
(phasing down to 20% at $15,000
of AGI)
Rate on dividends
0% for taxpayers in the 10%
and 15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets
0% for taxpayers in the
10% and 15% bracket;
15% for other brackets
EITC rate and maximum credit
No children: 7.65%, maximum




No children: 7.65%, maximum
$457; one child: 34%, maximum
$3,043; two children: 40%,





PEP and Pease limits on
personal exemptions and
itemized deductions reduced
by 2/3, thresholds indexed
for inflation
PEP and Pease limits on
personal exemptions and
itemized deductions
reduced by 2/3, thresholds
indexed for inflation
EITC phaseout range and rate
Standard Deduction
$5,450 (single person) /
$10,900 (married couple)
$5,700 (single person) /
$11,400 (married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$46,200 for single filers,
$69,950 for joint filers
$46,700 for single filers,
$70,950 for joint filers










$38,646. Increased by $3,000
(indexed for inflation) for joint
filers. 7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
Notes:
* Married couple filing jointly
** Indexing of income brackets for individual income tax began in 1985 under ERTA81 except for 1987 and 1988 when brackets were not indexed because of rate changes;
Changes in bracket amounts for 1985-1986, 1989-2000, and 2004-2007 occured as a result of indexing for inflation rather than from a change in tax legislation
*** 0% rate existed below these brackets until 1986
**** For years 1988-1990 rate applicable to highest income bracket is not the highest rate: 28% rate is applicable to two income brackets - the highest bracket and a lower one
[a] The taxable maximum for 1979-81 was set by statute; all other amounts were determined under automatic adjustment provisions of the Social Security Act
according to the national average wage index. The tax rate refers to the combined rate for employers and employees.
[b] OASDI: Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program
[c] HI: Medicare's Hospital Insurance program
[d] The upper limit on earnings subject to HI was repealed by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.
Sources: Tax Policy Center (http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/index.cfm), Social Security Administration (http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/cbb.html
and http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/taxRates.html), last accessed May 2011
***** Not indexed for inflation
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